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Abstract 
A major initiative in the US food and agriculture sector is the Food Safety Modernization Act 
(FSMA) of 2011. First, it empowers the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to embark on a 
preventive approach to food safety by requiring food firms to adapt traceability and HACCP 
systems along their supply chains. Secondly, the FDA is required to maintain strict border 
measures to ensure that unsafe foods of international origin are not allowed into domestic supply 
chains. Fruit and vegetables remains a key target under the law. As a result, fruit and vegetable 
import refusals are anticipated to increase. An area of contention, however, comes from the 
political-economy perspective where many think that the regulation has a disguised motive of 
providing economic protection. For example, the law exempts small scale producers in the US 
while no studies suggest they have been better at preventing foodborne illnesses; and the law 
comes at a time when the US fruit and vegetable industry faces increasing foreign competition 
while unemployment remained consistently high across almost all sectors of the US economy. In 
view of this, the potential exists for a politically motivated regulation to have far fetching 
implications on countries most dependent on the US market such as Mexico, Canada and China. 
Hence, the study seeks to establish whether a cause-and-effect relationship between political 
influence and import refusals exists in order to provide insights into the validity of the claim. 
Other objectives include assessing the trend in Salmonella foodborne disease incidence (reported 
by FDA as the single most challenging to US food supply chain) as a justification for FSMA; 
assessing the conformity of FSMA to international trade agreements and; the implications of the 
law for relative competitiveness of domestic and foreign firms. Using US agricultural sector 
unemployment and antidumping activity as proxy variables for political influence, the results 
suggest that import refusals from Mexico and Canada rise significantly when agricultural sector 
unemployment rises while a rise in antidumping cases increase refusals from Mexico but not for 
Canada and China. It therefore recommends further studies on import refusals regarding specific 
products before mounting a challenge against US import refusal behavior. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
       In the first decade of the 21
st
 century, trade in fruit and vegetables expanded considerably 
relative to many other agricultural products. According to Huang (2004, p.3): 
the average value share of fruits and vegetables (including pulses and tree nuts) in global agricultural 
exports increased from 11.7 percent in the period 1977-81 to 15.1 percent in 1987-91 and reached an 
alltime high of 16.5 percent in 1997-2001.  
This, in part, is due to: (1) technological innovations in transportation, communication and 
storage systems that allow fresh produce to be moved further in a fresh state and to be available 
as fresh products throughout the year (Pollack 2001); (2) increasing awareness of the nutritional 
advantages of fruit and vegetable consumption (Pollack 2001) and; (3) trade liberalization which 
opened most horticultural products to high valued markets (Gulati et al 2005). Consequently, the 
number of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) trade measures brought against fresh produce 
doubled to 270 over the period of 1995-2000 (FAO 2003) as consumers became more conscious 
about the health hazards associated with the production, processing and/or handling channels. 
       The US is the latest country to revise its SPS measures against fruit and vegetables as a 
result of high-profile foodborne disease incidence which are claimed to have undermined public 
confidence in the US food safety system (Carte Pate and Leavitt Partners 2010). Several cases of 
E. coli and Salmonella in the US have been associated with the consumption of domestic and 
imported foods including fruit and vegetables (Carte Pate and Leavitt Partners 2010). In 2011, 
for instance, Salmonellosis attributed to imported pawpaw from Mexico caused 97 
hospitalization cases in Texas (FDA 2011a) while E. coli associated with strawberry  farms in 
Oregon State reportedly led to a death (Kitzhaber 2011). At the national level, the Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that about 48 million Americans suffer from 
foodborne health complications in a year (Scharff 2012). Unlike other foodborne incidence that 
are declining, Salmonella contaminations continue to increase with an annual infection rate of 
1.2 million people (at an annual cost of US$365million) thereby posing a significant risk to US 
food safety (CDC 2010). 
       It is in response to this rising anxiety that US President Barack Obama signed into law new 
food legislation – the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) – in January 2011. The Act 
expands the regulatory mandate of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in an attempt to 
increase the efficacy of the US food safety system. According to Leavitt Partners (2011, p. 1): 
Several provisions in FSMA raise the standards for all registered facilities (domestic and foreign) and 
these will become an important hurdle when it comes to importing food into the U.S. Foreign facilities 
that produce, manufacture, hold, pack or distribute food will have to comply with registration 
requirements, increased U.S. FDA access to records, conducting hazard analysis and implementing 
preventive controls, performance standards, implementing product tracking systems and increased 
record keeping provisions, and implementing mitigation strategies for intentional adulteration.  
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The FDA must verify and certify that imported foods comply with the regulations. Food 
certification may also be done by any FDA accredited third party auditor (US Food Safety 
Modernization Act 2011, Section 307). Other provisions include allowing the FDA to grant 
expedited entry to importers that exhibit satisfactory compliance and, the mandate to embargo or 
mandatorily recall any food product it believes may have adverse health implications (US Food 
Safety Modernization Act 2011, Nakuja et al 2011). 
       The FSMA covers approximately 80 percent of all foods with the exception of meat, poultry 
and dairy products that are regulated separately by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
(FDA 2011b; Nakuja et al 2011). The FSMA, however, exempts small-scale producers and 
processors exclusively in the US under its provisions, but does not allow them for similar foreign 
firms (US Food Safety Modernization Act 2011, Section 419(f)). In the US, small scale firms are 
interpreted as  those who sell over 50 percent of their produce directly to consumers; sell within 
275 mile-radius of production site and/or have an annual gross income of not more than 
US$500,000 (Colorado Farm Market 2011; US Food Safety Modernization Act 2011, Section 
419a (4)). 
       The regulations have a major focus on fruit and vegetables (US Food Safety Modernization 
Act 2011, Section 419a (4)). This is because most fruit and vegetables are a favourable growth 
media for foodborne pathogens, and also because foodborne pathogens are a major hazard for 
US food supply chains (Ackerman 2002). While there is a widely held perception among the US 
public that the food safety standards in most foreign countries are lax, the US on the other hand 
consistently imports about 60 percent of the fresh fruit and vegetables consumed domestically 
(Superville and Jalonick 2011). It is for this reason that the law requires the FDA to develop safe 
agronomic practices that must be adopted by firms in foreign countries if they wish to continue 
exporting to the US (FDA 2011c).  
       The passage of FSMA brought forth varied questions about its likely effects on the food 
supply chains. Ribera and Knutson (2011) asserted that the FSMA will place substantial cost on 
private actors in the supply chain and consequently raise food prices. The increase in prices will 
likely arise from higher compliance cost which producers are expected to pass onto consumers. It 
is envisaged in this study that the regulations will likely increase the risk of fruit and vegetable 
exports by virtue of FDA‘s ―unlimited powers‖ to recall products or deny an export mandate 
based on its definition of satisfactory compliance. Such actions could make the regulation more 
costly for leading exporting countries (such as Canada, Mexico and China) whose fruit and 
vegetable farmers depend to a considerable degree on the US market. 
       From the political-economy perspective, that FSMA‘s non-foreign small-scale businesses 
exemption raises questions regarding whether it was lobbied for to increase standards against 
foreign products in order to provide protection to the domestic industry. Academics, of course, 
have long raised questions as to whether food safety measures were used in nefarious ways to 
provide economic protection. For example, according to Menzie and Prentice (1987, p. 947): 
There are suspicions and some evidence, however, that these regulations have been used to control 
movements beyond the legitimate levels.  
Kerr et al (1986), for example, established an inverse relationship between spot market price and 
Canadian beef rejections at the US border. Baylis et al (2009) have shown that import refusals 
rise when unemployment in a given import substitution sector is increasing. Investigating the 
manipulation of import refusals and food safety regulations to provide economic protection for 
domestic industry is the core objective of this thesis.  
3 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
       Lawley (2004) hypothesized that political decisions are largely driven by the short-term 
pressure of the political cycle. Hence, the recent performance of the economy may better reflect 
the incentive an incumbent government has to implement a policy that has direct influence on the 
economy. Lawley‘s hypothesis, therefore, suggests that government will be responsive to 
measures advocated by political pressure groups in times of poor economic performance than 
will be the case in an era of prosperity. This is because protectionist vested interests may have 
more resonance with voters in era of economic adversity. 
       Lawley (2004)‘s hypothesis may well reflect the situation surrounding the FSMA and its 
focus on fruit and vegetables. The FSMA is anticipated to increase fruit and vegetable import 
refusals as a result of its perceived higher standards against foreign firms, and it is a subject for 
debate as to whether the FSMA is politically motivated. This is particularly contentious given 
that the FSMA comes at the time when the US fruit and vegetable industry is facing increasing 
foreign competition with net imports rising from US$2billon to approximately US$11 billion 
over the period of 2001 to 2010 (Johnson 2012). The law also comes at the time when 
unemployment is consistently high across almost all sectors of the US economy as a result of the 
2008 financial crises, thereby raising expectations that politicians may be faced with 
considerable pressure to protect domestic industries. However, notwithstanding evidence of 
political motivated standards increasing import refusals for some selected products, the specific 
case of political influence in fruit and vegetable import refusals has not been investigated. 
       Secondly, complying with the new US regulations is mandatory. Hence, it presents an 
additional cost (i.e. compliance cost) to actors in the fruit and vegetable supply chain. While 
studies (e.g. Song and Cheng 2010; Markus et al 2005) suggest that higher compliance cost will 
decrease exports, Roberts et al (1999) argued that the effects of compliance cost on the domestic 
and foreign firms depends on the elasticity of demand for imports in the implementing country. 
As such, the effects of a regulation are localized and may not be generalizable. However, the 
specific analysis of the potential effect of US food regulations on the relative competitiveness of 
domestic and foreign firms under FSMA is yet to be studied. 
       Last, but not the least, the exemption of small scale producers from undertaking hazard 
analysis without extending the exemption to other small scale producers adds some important 
issues – it would appear to violate the Non-discrimination principle of the WTO. Besides, the 
FSMA was enacted on the grounds that foodborne disease incidence (especially Salmonella) was 
rising (FDA 2011d), yet no study verified whether it could justify the need for more stringent 
measures. Moreover, there appears to be no scientific evidence that small scale producers in the 
US have been better at preventing foodborne related incidence.  Hence, the legitimacy of the 
exemption remains questionable under the National Treatment principle of the WTO and its SPS 
agreement as well as US commitments under NAFTA. It is also expected that once full details of 
the FSMA regulations become available, foreign firms supplying the US may face higher 
compliance cost relative to US firms. The objectives of this thesis are therefore: 
1. To test for political influence in fruit and vegetable import refusals.  
2. To assess the prima facie justification for the new regulations (i.e. FSMA). 
3. To analyze the relative competitiveness of domestic and foreign firms under the FSMA. 
4. To assess the conformity of the FSMA with US commitments under the WTO, NAFTA 
and SPS agreement.  
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1.3 Justification 
       Trade measures under the SPS and TBT sub-agreements of the WTO are deemed legitimate 
if there is an identifiable problem that can be addressed through a measure. This requires a clear 
problem to be identified and the measure put in place to be explicitly related to the problem.  The 
assessment of the prima facie case for the revised regulations under the FSMA will provide a 
quantitative measure of the foodborne disease incidence situation in the US which was used to 
justify the enactment of the new regulations. Similarly, the test for political influence in fruit and 
vegetable import refusals provides evidence as to whether food regulations are only serving a 
legitimate objective or, in addition, have been providing economic protection. This information 
can be the basis upon which international trade challenges against US food regulations could be 
mounted. 
       The current regulations results in two major kinds of compliance groups in the market: 
domestic and foreign producers (the latter are expected to bear greater compliance cost), yet 
studies delineating the potential effects of compliance costs associated with the FSMA are 
limited.  Determining these effects is important for shedding light on how the FSMA will affect 
the relative competiveness of domestic and foreign firms in the fruit and vegetable industry. 
       The present study seeks to review literature on the conformity of the new regulations 
(FSMA) to the WTO, NAFTA and SPS agreements. Since there is the propensity for 
governments to institute regulations that are biased against foreign firms, a review is  important 
to shed light on any discrepancies that could form the basis for exporting countries to mount a 
challenge in the existing international dispute mechanisms.   
 
1.4 Scope of the study 
       While there is a considerable difference between food safety standards and food safety 
regulations, the two are used interchangeably in this study. The study focuses on fruit and 
vegetables although the new regulations cover a wider range of foods. The study also employs 
highly aggregated national level data on import refusals as firm level data is largely absent. 
       The new regulations arising from the FSMA have not yet been fully developed and 
implemented. Hence, the analysis provides limited insights into expectations regarding how the 
regulations will affect the competitiveness of domestic and foreign firms. This study is by no 
means a complete assessment of the effects of the new regulations on firm level competiveness 
and the results may therefore vary depending upon the underlying assumptions.  The assessment 
of the conformity of regulations to WTO, NAFTA and SPS agreement is based on a social 
science interpretation of the trade rules rather than a strict legal interpretation. Hence, the 
conclusions only provide the basis to justify a legal investigation. 
 
1.5 Organization  
       This thesis is organized into eight chapters. Besides Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 that 
covers the Introduction, Literature Review and Theoretical Framework respectively, the 
remaining part of the thesis is organized into standalone chapters each addressing an objective. 
Each chapter has an objective focuses on some thematic area including methodology, results, 
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discussion and summary. Hence, Chapter 4 covers political influence in fruit and vegetable 
import refusals while Chapter 5 focus on empirical evidence for prima facie justification for new 
regulations. Chapter 6 zeros in on the relative competitiveness of foreign and domestic firms 
while Chapter 7 concentrates on the conformity of the new regulations with WTO, NAFTA and 
SPS agreements. Chapter 8 summarizes the general conclusions and recommendations of the 
study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
       This chapter reviews literature on four thematic areas. Issues covered include historical 
perspectives on food safety, impacts of food safety standards on trade, foodborne disease 
incidence and areas where the SPS is weak that provide the basis for illegitimate protection, and 
the relationship between food safety standards and compliance costs.  
 
2.2 Historical perspective of food safety 
       There is considerable evidence that food safety has been part of every generation‘s concern. 
In the Old Testament, God warned the people of Israel neither to touch nor eat dead animals. 
Anyone who did was required to wash his or her cloths to become clean (Leviticus 11: 38-39). In 
ancient China, - 500 B.C. – Confucius, an ethical philosopher, is reported to have warned people 
against the consumption of spoiled food or food that had not been properly cooked (Roberts 
2001; Food-safety-and-you.com 2010). In 1795, Napoleon Bonaparte, in his ambition to extend 
the territory under French control in Europe, promised to reward anyone who could provide a 
mechanism to ensure that food supplied to his soldiers did not spoil (Ding and Wolfstetter 2011; 
Food-safety-and-you.com 2010). In all of these, while the intention to keep consumers safe from 
food hazards or make food last is by far the primary focus, making food safe and storable 
remains challenging. 
       Progress in food safety has been accelerated by the rise of science and technology. The 
invention of the microscope is noted to have allowed scientists view microbial organisms and 
further consolidated the science that maggots in rotten meat were hatched from the microscopic 
eggs of flies as opposed to the thoughts that they originated from lifeless animal flesh (Kusinitz 
2012). Gartner‘s1 path breaking experiment in the 18th century, for example, was the first 
scientific investigation to establish a causal relationship between microbial organisms and a 
foodborne disease (Food-safety-and-you.com 2010; Roberts 2001). Gartner made people 
consume beef from a sick cow, who subsequently became sick themselves, leading to the 
conclusion that the disease causing bacteria came from the diarrhoea of cows (Food-safety-and-
you.com 2010; Roberts 2001). This experiment provided important insights into how foodborne 
disease organisms can be transmitted and their consequence for human health. 
       Despite the awareness that scientists had created about foodborne hazards, standards for the 
production, processing, handling and/or storage of foods received little attention until foodborne 
diseases garnered a wider national interest.  Statistics had revealed that countries were losing 
many more people to foodborne diseases than were lost in combat. A typical example is the 
Spanish American War (1898) in which the US lost over a 1000 soldiers as a result of spoiled 
food supplied to them as opposed to 379 who died in combat (Food-safety-and-you.com 2010).  
                                                          
1
 Roberts (2001) referred to August Gärtner as the first scientist to isolate a foodborne disease causing organism 
(Bacillus enteritidis) from patients who had eaten a sick cow.  
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In response, US President Theodore Roosevelt ordered an investigation into the meat-packing 
industry whose recommendations provided the impetus for the government to enact the Pure 
Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act of 1906 (Food-safety-and-you.com 2010). 
       Food safety issues have heightened in recent times, which many partly attribute to 
globalisation. Kerr (2004) argues that globalisation has been instrumental in raising the profile of 
food safety because there is an increasing chance for people to become vectors of disease 
transmission. Such awareness, coupled with improved scientific knowledge and the role of the 
state in providing protection against foodborne hazards has provided the incentives for 
governments to establish institutions to deal more effectively with food safety issues. Examples 
include, the FDA of US, founded in 1930; the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Forestry of Germany, founded in 1949; Australia New Zealand Food Authority, founded in 
1991; and many others. These institutions are charged with introducing sanitary methods in food 
production and handling. However, with trade expanding in the midst of rising food safety 
concerns, food safety regulations acted increasingly as trade barriers as a result of the absence of 
internationally harmonized safety measures and institutions to foster them. For example, the 
International Office of Epizootics (OIE) reports that a Rinderpest outbreak in Belgium as a result 
of the movement of cattle from India to Brazil through Antwerp port (in 1920) led to a complete 
ban in trade (OIE 2010). Incidents such as this created the need for an international platform to 
handle health related issues that impacted on animal trade. Consequently, the International Office 
of Epizootics was established in 1924 to provide governance on trade related issues pertaining to 
animal health. 
       The jurisdiction of the OIE was limited to the 24 countries in which it had been ratified (OIE 
2010). A larger international organisation - the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
- was signed (in 1947) and ratified in 1948.  GATT‘s main objective was to create an 
international negotiation platform where tariffs, which had been raised in the Great Depression 
of the 1930s, would be negotiated down (Gaisford and Kerr 2001). 
       The GATT-1947 did not have an explicit clause to deal with sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) trade measures. The SPS measures were inherently captured under the non-discrimination 
principle which required both imported and foreign products to be treated the same. Such 
treatments include pesticide use, plant and animal health (FAO 2000). Nonetheless, member 
countries were mandated under GATT Article XX (b) to take measures they deem fit in order to 
protect human, animal, or plant life/health such that consumer safety is not compromised, but 
those measures are not be disguised protection (FAO 2000). 
       Following Tokyo Round of negotiations (completed in 1979) that established the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), it was brought to light that SPS measures were fast 
becoming an effective alternative trade protection measure as tariffs were negotiated down (FAO 
2000, Isaac 2001). Consequently, SPS measures were formally slated for negotiation during the 
Uruguay Round (FAO 2000).  The FAO (2010) reports that opinions regarding SPS measures 
were divided along developed and developing country lines and the issues were: (1) what ought 
to be an SPS measure and; (2) whether they needed to be harmonised. While developed countries 
insisted for each country to have its own SPS measure, developing countries argued for 
harmonization of SPS measures because they feared fragmented standards could afford 
developed countries the opportunity to use costly standards against their products (FAO 2000). 
In the end, five areas were agreed upon: (1) ―international harmonization on the basis of the 
standards developed by the international organizations‖; (2) ―development of an effective 
notification process for national regulations‖; (3) ―setting-up of a system for the bilateral 
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resolution of disputes‖; (4) ―improvement of the dispute settlement process‖ and; (5) ―provisions 
concerning the scientific basis for measures‖ (FAO 2000). 
       The SPS Agreement employs a science-based approach for setting standards. Three pre-
existing scientific organisations were officially recognized as standards setting organizations. 
These are the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), the International Office of Epizootics 
(OIE) and Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention. 
       Codex Alimentarius Commission: The Codex Alimentarius Commission is responsible for 
developing food safety standards as they apply in food trade (WTO 2011a). The organisation 
urges member countries to harmonise standards as a strategy to address differences that could 
hinder trade. 
       The International Office of Epizootics (OIE) – or the World Organization for Animal Health 
as it is also called: The OIE is responsible for developing standards for animal health and 
zoonotic
2
 diseases. It is charged with informing member countries about animal disease 
outbreaks and control mechanisms across the world, keeping up to date records of animal 
diseases, coordinating animal surveillance and disease responses research, and promoting 
harmonisation of regulations in animal and animal product trade (WTO 2011a). 
       The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC): The IPPC is responsible for 
developing measures to protect domestic plant resources from disease and pest infestation 
associated with trade. Its main activities include developing standards for pest risk analysis and 
measures for establishing pest-free zones (WTO 2011a). 
       These science-based organisations provide guidelines and minimum standards on which 
national standards must be based. Member countries may use higher standards provided there is 
sufficient scientific justification. At any point that a country embarks on a domestic regulatory 
measure that, in turn, affects trade; that country is obliged to notify others and have a bureau 
where enquiries can be made (WTO 2011a). 
       The SPS agreement also promotes the use of equivalence of regulations negotiated between 
importers and exporters. In this regard, if an exporting country demonstrates that its domestic 
standards provide the same level of protection as the importing country‘s own, the two standards 
should be accepted as equivalent. Further, the agreement also recognises regionalisation policies 
whereby parts of countries declared free of a disease may be granted access to importing country 
markets (WTO 2011a).  
 
2.3 Impact of food safety standards on trade  
       While food safety standards are primarily targeted at protecting consumers against food 
hazards, there is an understanding that standards may be motivated by the desire to provide 
economic protection. Rent-seeking interest groups may lobby the government to impose 
illegitimate, overly strict, or excessively costly standards that will protect them against foreign 
competition. Such standards are as a result of the weaknesses in the SPS agreement which makes 
it a bit more difficult to establish a unifying science for standards justification. Such hidden 
motives have provided the impetus for research into the impacts of food safety standards on 
trade. 
       The impact of food safety standards on trade has mixed evidence. Evidence on one side of 
the argument supports the proposition that food safety standards enhance trade. In particular, 
                                                          
2
 A zoonotic disease is one that can be transmitted between animals and humans (WHO  2012) 
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those who view standards as a market failure correcting mechanism will argue that appropriate 
standards increase consumer confidence and demand. For example, governments are inclined to 
ban the importation of any food that poses a danger to consumers where appropriate standards do 
not exist. With standards in place, imports may be re-opened to foods that meet the requirements 
of the food safety laws. An example of the case where standards were shown to enhance trade is 
Aflatoxin B1
3
 standards in cereals and nuts. Applying a gravity model to trade from 15 
developing countries (exporters) and four importing countries, Otsuki et al (2001a) demonstrated 
that the presence of Aflatoxin B1 standards will increase trade by 51 percent relative to where no 
standards exist. 
       Secondly, the impact of food safety standards has been studied in terms of harmonised 
versus fragmented standards - where countries have different standards. Otsuki et al (2001b) 
compared the impact of harmonised Aflatoxin B1 standards with fragmented standards using a 
gravity model. Their results supports the proposition that harmonisation of standards is trade 
enhancing. They estimated trade in cereals and nuts to increase by US$38 million dollars when 
standards are harmonised compared to when they are fragmented. 
       Furthermore, the impact of food safety standards have been investigated in the context of 
their impact on developed versus developing countries. Henson and Loader (2001) argue that 
developed countries are better at complying with food safety standards than developing ones 
because the developed countries have the institutional capacity and appropriate infrastructure 
required for effective compliance. Consequently, stringent food safety standards could make 
developed countries more competitive in international markets than their developing country 
counterparts. Anders and Caswell (2009)‘s work corroborates Henson and Loader (2001)‘s 
assertion in their examination of the situations under which food safety standards catalyze or 
inhabit trade.  By partitioning countries engaged in seafood trade with US into developed and 
developing, they concluded that stringent standards negatively (acted as trade barrier) affected 
seafood trade with developing countries and positively (act as catalyst) affected seafood trade 
with developed countries. Their conclusion, therefore, supports the proposition that the impact of 
food safety standards depends on the ability of the exporting country to comply. 
       Roberts et al (1999), nonetheless, maintain that analysing the impact of food safety 
regulations on trade without taking into account the price elasticity of import demand may not 
lead to accurate estimates.  They argued that standards result in increased product price since 
producers will usually pass on the added cost, in whole or part, to consumers. Hence, the 
ultimate impact of food safety standards will depend on the price elasticity of the product in 
question. Where the product exhibits inelastic demand, increased product price as a result of 
tighter standards will have little effect on trade because consumers are insensitive to price 
changes. On the other hand, imposition of standards will negatively affect trade for products 
characterised by elastic demand.    
       Research has also largely analysed the impact of food safety standards on trade with little 
effort to segment their effects for private and public standards. While public standards are 
mandatory food laws of a country (e.g. FSMA), private standards, on the other hand, are 
developed by individual firms or groups of firms but may be compulsory only for a producer 
who wants to sell into their supply chain (Hobbs 2010, Henson 2006). It is the government‘s 
responsibility to verify that foods supplied into these private supply chains are in compliance 
with the state‘s food laws irrespective of their origin.  Henson (2006), therefore, argues that 
                                                          
3
 Wilson and Otsuki (2001) described Aflatoxin B1 as a toxic-carcinogenic chemical that develops in cereals and 
nuts when the produce is not properly dried and stored. 
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empirical estimates segregating food safety impacts are limited because both private and public 
standards act together in influencing trade, and trade may change when either of them is 
considerably altered. Henson (2006) also maintains that private standards could become a 
significant trade barrier since they are not sanctioned under WTO, and therefore do not need to 
conform to international trade rules.  
 
2.4 The US fruit and vegetable standards 
       The US is the world largest importer of fruit and vegetables by value, accounting for 
approximately 20 percent of world imports (FAOSTAT 2010). Internationally, importation is 
governed by the Plant Protection Act 2000.  The Act empowers the state to inspect and certify 
that imported fruit and vegetables do not harbour disease organisms that could harm domestic 
plant resources. The US officials are also required by the Act to keep list of countries from which 
fruit and vegetables may be imported in order to limit the movement of pests and obnoxious 
weeds that could harm domestic plant resources as a result of trade (US Plant Protection Act 
2000).  
       Further, the US develops mandatory industry wide standards to govern fruit and vegetable 
marketing in the country. For instance, the Agricultural Marketing Services (AMS) define 
industry wide standards and implement the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act 1993 for 
fruit and vegetables. The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act specifically seeks to ensure 
fair and ethical trading practices are upheld in fresh and frozen fruit and vegetable marketing 
(United Fresh Produce 2011). 
       For private standards, the Trade Standards Practitioners Network (2011) and Bureau Veritas 
Services (2007) maintain that although GlobalGAP is the largest internationally recognised farm 
level private standard for fresh fruit, the Safe Quality Food (SQF) 1000 standard largely govern 
fresh fruit and vegetable standards in the US. The SQF is charged with ensuring that microbial 
contamination in fresh fruit and vegetables is reduced to acceptable minimums as defined by US 
food laws (Trade Standards Practitioners Network 2011). The incoming Food Safety 
Modernisation Act 2011 might require adjustments to these private standards in the US and 
globally if exporters wish to continue accessing the US fruit and vegetable market since it 
requires the FDA to develop mandatory agronomic standards for fruit and vegetables.  
 
2.5 Foodborne diseases, food safety standards and protectionism 
       Hobbs and Kerr (1999) underscored the importance of microbial organisms in cheese 
production as an agrifood industry. In 1997, they estimated that over 15,000,000 tonnes of 
cheese produced worldwide dependent on microbial activity.  Notwithstanding these, pathogenic 
microbes on the other hand, continue to threaten the safety of food, cause food spoilage and 
account for over 90 percent of foodborne diseases (Hobbs and Kerr 1999).  
      Varying opinions exist to explain the increasing microbial contamination in food chains. For 
example, Hobbs and Kerr (1992) argued that the rise in microbial contamination is partly 
attributed to longer supply chains. According to them, food supply chains have lengthened with 
regards to number of participants and distance over which foods have to be moved. In particular, 
increasing participation expand opportunities for microbial contamination while longer distances 
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tend to reduce the shelf-life of most fresh fruit and vegetables even before they get to consumers. 
Hence, microbial contaminations turn into a cost for businesses and consumers as supply chains 
lengthen. 
       While foodborne diseases have been widely publicized, it appears that their cost has not 
been satisfactorily estimated as a result of methodological weaknesses.  It is perceived that cost 
of foodborne diseases are either overestimated or underestimated. Hobbs and Kerr (1999) argue 
that the cost of foodborne diseases, when estimated as direct medical cost and cost of spoiled 
food, is an underestimation since cost of private and public standards that are in place to prevent 
disease incidence are largely ignored. They also argue that while researchers might be tempted to 
use an alternative estimation measure such as willingness to pay for disease free food, it may 
underestimate or overestimate depending on the respondent‘s perception of the significance of 
foodborne diseases. 
       Despite the challenge in costing foodborne diseases, there seems to be a general 
understanding that foodborne diseases are increasingly becoming both an economic and a 
societal menace in the world. In response, food safety measures have been evolving rapidly. For 
example, in 1991, the UK enacted the Due Diligence Defense Act which had the objective of 
holding participants along food supply chains more responsible to lapses in food safety (Hobbs 
and Kerr 1992). The EU Plant Protection Act requires phytosanitary certification on all imported 
fruit and vegetables outside and upon arrival in EU (United Nations 2007); and the US FSMA 
requires food firms to adopt a preventive approach to food safety by implementing HACCP at 
sensitive points of processing, handling and storage. These Acts empower the authorities of their 
respective countries to define standards governing foods. Although the standards have legitimate 
intent, a number of concerns have been expressed regarding the basis on which such standards 
are justified. It is believed that standards may be enacted with the hidden motive of providing 
economic protection. For example, Davis (2003) maintains that EU‘s ban on hormone-treated 
beef has been mentioned by European officials as one arising from public pressure rather than a 
scientific justification. 
       The SPS agreement maintains that food safety standards may be instituted provided there is 
a sufficient scientific justification, and standards must be proportional to the level of risk.  
However, what constitute sufficient science is disputable. What seem to compound the 
acceptability of scientific justification are the two acceptable alternative risk analysis 
frameworks within SPS Agreement: (1) the scientific rationality approach and; (2) the social 
rationality approach. These approaches differ in their definition of risk and account for the 
differences in judgement and measures needed to address risk (Isaac 2001). Depending on the 
intended motive, the implementing country may use a risk assessment framework that provides 
the highest form of protection while exporting countries may not be able to challenge it.  The 
SPS agreement also lacks discipline on how high standards may be set. No upper limit on 
standards‘ stringency implies that highly restrictive trade standards that are not proportional to 
the perceived or actual risk can be equally justified.  
       Further, the SPS allows countries to take precautionary measures where there is not 
sufficient scientific evidence to assess a risk. For example, in 1989, Canada and the US took 
precautionary measures to ban the importation of fruit and vegetables from Chile after grapes 
tainted with cyanide from Chile were found in the US (Robinson 2011). The challenge countries 
face is the duration of time that markets take to re-open after precaution or real risk has been 
identified.  The SPS agreement has no definite time for such markets to re-open and this can 
keep market closed forever. For instance, Isaac (2001) indicates that many export markets were 
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still close to Canadian beef after BSE occurred in Canada (in 2003) although the government 
believe it had eliminated the menace. 
       In the fruit and vegetable industry, the US and other importing countries banned importation 
of avocados from Mexico when seed weevil
4
 was first noticed in Mexican orchards in 1914. 
Although the Mexican government controlled the pest and other countries re-opened their 
markets, the US remained closed even after scientific studies proved that the pest was 
successfully controlled (Strollo 1997). The case was raised during the NAFTA negotiations as 
Mexico pushed the US to allow imports. In 1995, the US accepted imports from Mexico to 
Alaska on the basis that the pest could not survive the cold weather in Alaska (Strollo 1997; 
Bakshi 2003). The avocado growers association in California rebelled against the decision 
indicating that the basis for assessing the risk from regional imports led to underestimation 
(Strollo 1997). No pest outbreak was identified and subsequent negotiations led to the US further 
allowing imports into north-eastern states in 2001 (Bakshi 2003). This implies that the ban only 
existed to provide economic protection and the Mexican avocados had been denied access to the 
US market for much of the 20
th
 century – to the direct benefit of US producers. 
       It can be argued that producers are those who would traditionally request protection against 
imports. However, the source of protectionism seems to be broadening such that consumers are 
the source of protectionist activities regarding the kind of food a country can import. For 
example, the EU banned beef produced using growth hormones from North America because 
their consumers did not want it. Kerr (2010) indicated that although scientists, including EU 
scientists, have found that growth hormones do not pose a risk, EU consumers have lobbied 
governments to maintain the ban and, instead, accept retaliation from North America. Such 
tendencies only tend to inhibit trade despite the lack of scientific evidence. 
       Further, protection in recent times has emerged from the politician‘s interest in pursuing an 
action just to please interest groups although such actions might not be scientifically justified. 
Such acts are what Kerr (2004) refers to as political precaution
5
. For instance, when the World 
Health Organization (WHO) recommended that regular washing of hands was a safe precaution 
to avoid infestation and spread of H1N1 influenza after confirmed reports publicised its outbreak 
in Mexico, Kerr (2009) argued that China (the world‘s leading producer of pork) defied WHO‘s 
directive and its leadership exercised political precaution by banning imports just to shore up 
domestic prices that had plummeted as a result of highly publicised media reports about the 
influenza. 
       These lapses in compliance with the SPS agreement coupled with the incentives to provide 
protection has motivated researchers to devise means of introducing transparency and to shed 
light on protectionist tendencies. For example, the SPS agreement encourages trading nations to 
use regionalization in handling trade in animal and animal products where imports can be 
accepted from a disease free zone. This recommendation has largely not been adhered to. In 
times of outbreak, the entire country‘s exports are banned. In response, Loppacher et al (2006) 
provided insights about measures needed to address the regionalization of disease incidence 
using a partial equilibrium model where an outbreak will be restraint to geographic areas but not 
political borders. Their study suggest that regionalisation will be effective if countries provide a 
                                                          
4
 Strollo (1997) describes the seed weevil as an avocado pest that destroys avocado seed and contaminates the flesh 
thereby causing a loss in appearance and market value. 
5
 Kerr (2004, p. 35) defines political precaution as ―when politicians are being pressured to "do something", or to be 
"seen to be doing something" in the face of strongly expressed concerns by members of civil society even when 
risks are very low or largely speculative‖. 
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compensation scheme to the affected areas such that they  are not enticed to smuggle their 
produce to the disease free-zone for sale. 
       Baylis et al (2009) empirically tested for political pressure in US seafood import refusals. It 
is believed that import refusal could be politically influenced given that former quantitative 
restrictions have been eliminated. They used three variables to proxy political pressure: (1) 
change in employment within a given import substitution sector; (2) number of anti-dumping 
cases brought against a product and; (3) lobbying expenditure. They explained that when a given 
domestic sector is shedding labour (unemployment) as a result of increased foreign competition, 
the domestic industry may lobby government to minimize the amount of imports into the country 
and that could be seen in rising import refusals. Also, producers of like products within a country 
may file an antidumping case against a product as a direct means of seeking protection. Hence, 
rising antidumping cases may elicit a response whereby government is pressed into using the 
border inspection mechanism to step up refusals. The conclusions were significant with regards 
to unemployment and antidumping but not with lobbying expenditure. A specific case where 
anti-dumping is thought to be politically motivated is fresh tomato trade. For example, in 2001, 
US producers filed an anti-dumping case against Canadian greenhouse tomatoes and Canada, 
later in the same year, filed an antidumping case against US tomatoes. The study to determine 
injury did not find evidence of injury being suffered by US tomato producers and Canada 
subsequently withdrew their application which tends to indicate that its motivation was 
retaliation (Schmitz et al 2003). 
 
2.6 Food safety standards and compliance cost 
       Hobbs and Kerr (1992) argue that the compliance cost of food safety regulations can be 
substantive depending on the market and the risk associated with a particular geographic 
location. They argue that compliance cost may arise as a result of training of personal, laboratory 
testing, etc. Maskus et al (2005) analysed the increase in cost of exporting for firms in 
developing countries when complying with developed countries standards. Their study suggests 
that a 1 percent increase in investment to comply with standards raise variable production cost 
within the range of 0.06 and 0.13 percent. 
       Further, compliance with food safety standards may alter the competitive advantage of firms 
in an international market. Henson (2006) argue that where food safety becomes a primary 
concern to consumers, competition is shifted from price to safety and firms use private standards 
as mechanisms to outcompete each other. Moreover, Henson and Heasman (1998) finds that  
while small firms are laggards in complying with food safety standards compared to large firms, 
large firms are generally better at complying with standards in a manner that yield competitive 
advantage over smaller firms. Consequently, firms that are more competitive on standards have 
the tendency to lobby for more stringent regulations in order to eliminate their competitors 
(Hammoudi et al 2011). 
       In addition, compliance cost could potentially change the relationship between actors in the 
supply chain or the structure of firms. Complying with standards may involve investment in 
specialised assets and agents will want relationships that best safeguard those investments. 
Where the degree of asset specificity is high such that the asset has zero alternative value outside 
the given use, the higher the chance that firms will want to vertically integrate (Williamson 
1986).  
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2.7 Summary 
       Food hazards are recognised as a major public health risk. Hazards can be in the form of 
poisoning or foodborne diseases arising from pathogenic organisms. Besides the direct cost of 
medication and deaths, foodborne hazards add a substantive cost to businesses and governments 
as a result of the private and public standards that must be developed to prevent or limit the 
effects of outbreaks. However, standards are increasingly becoming a challenge to international 
agrifood trade leading to the establishment of international agreements such as SPS and TBT to 
handle food issues in trade.  Rather than enhancing trade, lapses in the agreements have become 
the means that threaten their success. Standards are also perceived as politically motivated and 
may not be based on science. In the SPS agreement – which focuses on food safety regulations – 
countries can set higher standards without other member countries being able to determine if 
those standards are proportional to the risk. Hence, countries, especially developed countries, 
continue to impose more stringent standards resulting from consumer‘s lobbying and rent-
seeking groups. While some estimates suggest that such standards are trade enhancing, others 
have equally shown their negative impacts. It is also hinted that stringent standards may be 
increasingly eliminating smaller firms and firms in developing countries from high valued 
markets. Depending on the compliance cost and location of the firms, standards are changing the 
supply chain relationships towards vertical coordination and increasing use of contracts as a 
result of the rising monitoring and specialised investment that are made to comply with them. 
       Having reviewed relevant literature on the historical perspectives through to protectionism in 
food safety standards, the next chapter focuses on theoretical framework underlying food safety 
regulations pertaining to the study.    
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
       The chapter presents the theoretical concepts underlying food safety standards and how they 
are used to provide economic protection from international competitors. It is therefore divided 
into two subsections: economic concepts pertaining to food safety regulations; and protectionist 
use of food safety regulations in international trade.  
 
3.2 The economics of food safety standards 
 Roberts et al (1999) indicate that food safety regulations act as a mechanism to correct market 
failures associated with the production, processing and handling of food along the supply chain. 
Such market failures arise as a result of asymmetric information about food attributes. Market 
failure is therefore the rationale behind food safety standards and underpins the conceptual 
framework developed herein. 
       The Fig 3.1 illustrates the concept of food safety regulations from the market failure 
perspective as it applies to FSMA, where the vertical and horizontal axes are price and quantity 
respectively. It is assumed that a firm may either choose to produce (1) safe food or (2) unsafe 
food (i.e. food contaminated with pathogenic organisms). Safe food production is however 
deterred because of food‘s credence attributes which creates the incentive for unsafe food to be 
sold as safe. Hence, a safe food producer is not able to charge premium for safety.  
       The firm is therefore faced with either of the two costs: (1) cost of supplying safe food; and 
(2) cost of supplying unsafe food. In the diagram, the marginal cost of safe food and unsafe food 
are MC
1
 and MC respectively while AC
1
 and AC are their respective average costs.  The utility 
function of consumers is such that safety is preferred. Hence, the firm minimizes cost of safe 
food by producing q
1
 at P
1
. However, since the firm does not have the incentive to invest in 
safety, food safety is undersupplied. As a result, the firm‘s actual average cost falls from AC1 to 
AC. In the full information world, the non-safe food producer would have been producing q* at 
P where it fully discloses information about the safety of its food. However, as the firm is aware 
that consumers do not have full information about the safety of its product, there is an incentive 
for it to produce unsafe food for sale as safe food. This is done by equating the marginal cost of 
unsafe food to the average cost of safe food and thereby produces more product (q) at market 
price P
1
. This is a market failure since the firm is undersupplying safety though consumers 
presumably paid for it. The government‘s goal is therefore to institute measures that mandate the 
firm to supply safe food. To accomplish this, the government institutes new food regulations that 
make it mandatory for the firm to produce safe food and to help consumers have the value for 
safety they pay for. If the regulations are correctly structured, complying with safety standards 
lead to an increase in average and marginal costs of firms from AC and MC to AC
1
 and MC
1
 
respectively and the firm produces q1 at P
1
 by equating marginal cost of  safe food to its average 
cost. The compliance cost of the regulations is therefore equivalent to the area of ABqq
1
.  
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Fig 3.1 Food safety standards as a corrective measure in market failure 
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3.3 Protectionism framework in food safety regulations 
       Although food safety regulations are primarily targeted at correcting market failures 
associated with food, the regulations could, however, be constituted to offer disguised economic 
protection. The Fig 3.2 illustrates how food safety regulations may be used to provide protection 
to the domestic industry. The vertical and horizontal axes are price and quantity respectively 
while D and S are demand and supply respectively in the importing country. In the diagram, the 
demand facing the domestic industry (D) is assumed to be representing safe food. The 
regulations in place which ensure the present level of food safety are referred to as ―Normal 
regulations‖. When the importing country does not implement any further safety measures, Qs1 
of food is supplied by the domestic producers while Qd
1
 is the quantity demanded in the 
economy. Since demand exceeds supply the domestic economy imports an amount of food equal 
to IM
1
 (i.e. IM
1
=Qd
1
- Qs
1
). 
       Let us now assume that the domestic producers complain about low prices for their products 
as a result of foreign competition. The government, being aware that imports cannot be restricted 
through the use of tariffs or quantitatively, possibly because of international commitments, may 
decide to use more stringent food safety regulatory measures – referred to as ―overly strict 
regulations‖. To be able to justify these regulations, the government may look for some real or 
perceived evidence such as foodborne contaminations that are associated with imported food. It 
is assumed herein that evidence of such are found and the government decides to implement a 
regulatory mechanism to reduce the risk of foodborne complications. 
       The compliance cost of the new regulation will make food more expensive in the domestic 
economy (as foreign producers who are not able to meet the regulatory requirements exit the 
market) leading to an increase in food price from P to P
1
. Domestic production is stimulated as a 
result of the higher price leading to an increase in quantity supply from Qs
1
 to Qs
2
 while demand 
declines from Qd
1
 to Qd
2
 and imports decline from IM
1
 to IM
2
 as a result. Although the 
regulation increase producer surplus in the domestic economy by A (which is the disguised 
motive of the regulation), consumer surplus decline by A+B+C+E.  The regulatory intervention 
of overly strict regulation therefore leads to a decline in welfare (i.e. welfare decline by B+C+E) 
and a deadweight loss to the economy of E.  
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3.4 Summary 
       Food safety regulations exist primarily to correct market failures associated with the 
production, processing and/or handling of food. Such market failure arises as a result of the 
credence nature of some food attributes. Hence, the role of the government is to ensure that 
regulations are effective in communicating information about these attributes to consumers. 
However, the regulations may also be constituted in a manner that it is meant to provide 
disguised protection to the domestic industry. This is possible because the SPS agreement - 
which governs domestic food regulations - does not place an upper limit on the stringency of 
food regulations. As such, importing countries can increase the stringency of their regulations to 
the extent that it is over and above the scientifically recommended level. Such overly strict 
measures turn to eliminate foreign competitors to the benefit of domestic producers but it 
deteriorates consumers‘ welfare. Hence, the next chapter test for political influence in fruit and 
vegetable import refusals as one disguised form of using a regulatory measure to influence 
refusals for domestic industry gain.   
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Chapter 4: Political Influence in Import Refusals 
 
4.1 Introduction 
       Chapter 4 tests the proposition that fruit and vegetable import refusals under US food safety 
regulations have been politically motivated. It includes sections on the methodology, results and 
discussion, and summary. 
 
4.2 Methodology  
       Non-compliance with food safety regulations constitute the acceptable basis on which food 
destined for import is rejected. From the political-economy perspective, regulations serve as a 
framework under which protection may be achieved through refusals. However, regulations may 
not be changed frequently to provide the needed protection in response to the desires of domestic 
groups. In response, interest groups may have to lobby decision makers to alter the manner in 
which government officials apply them. For instance, Kerr et al (1986) finds that Canadian beef 
tended to be inspected and rejected more often at the US border when the spot market price of 
beef in the US was low. This is the type of political influenced behavior the study examines.  
       In this thesis, political influence is defined as tacit manipulation of fruit and vegetable 
imports to protect the vested economic interests of the US fruit and vegetable industry. This can 
be accomplished by rejecting products destined for exports from countries that compete with US 
industry for the local market in accordance with the domestic market conditions and the desires 
of interest groups. The refusals have to be tacit because refusals based on domestic sector 
interests contravene international trade agreements. Such interests include protection from 
foreign competition and retention of employment in the industry. 
      Several countries compete with the domestic farmers for the US market. Hence, the vested 
interests of the US fruit and vegetable industry could have far reaching implications on their 
exports. According to USDA trade statistics, from 2000 to 2011 Mexico (the leading exporter to 
US) supplied approximately 34 percent by value of total US imports, and about 70 percent of 
Mexican fruit and vegetables are exported to the US. Canada‘s share of US fruit and vegetable 
imports (as the second largest exporter by value) has averaged approximately 13 percent from 
2000 to 2010. Approximately 85 percent by value of Canada‘s fruit and vegetable exports are 
destined for the US market. Further, China emerged as one of the world‘s major exporters of 
fresh food products after the 2008 financial crises. Although China is currently the fourth largest 
exporter, it has been the source of approximately eight percent, by value, of US imported fruit 
and vegetables. The trend also suggests that China‘s exports will expand considerably relative to 
those of Canada and Mexico. Hence, the US fruit and vegetable market is important to these 
countries. 
       The FDA, by its constitutional mandate, verifies that all imported fruit and vegetables are in 
compliance with US food regulations at the point of entry. Those that are not in compliance are 
either refused entry, re-exported or destroyed (Humphrey 2003).  Following the argument that 
food regulations may be politically motivated to provide economic protection to domestic 
industries, Baylis et al (2009) tested for political pressure in US seafood import refusals using 
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monthly observations over the period of 1998 to 2004.  Their implicit assumption is that 
governments can effectively provide protection to domestic producers by increasing import 
refusals. They thought this activity was likely because quantitative restrictions had been 
eliminated under WTO trade rules agreed upon in the Uruguay Round. 
       The approach of Baylis et al (2009) is adapted to test the hypothesis of political influence 
applied to fruit and vegetables refused entry into US from Mexico, Canada and China. While 
acknowledging that our examination of political influence in import refusals prior to the new 
regulatory regime is not a direct test for political influence in impending regulations (i.e. FSMA), 
it can provide some insights about how the pending regulations will operate. In particular, the 
test will establish whether there appears to be political influence in fruit and vegetable import 
refusals to inform the debate as to whether the anticipated rise in refusals under FSMA is 
politically motivated. 
       In this study, we use unemployment rate as a measure of political influence. It is 
hypothesized that a rise in unemployment will be associated with an increase in import refusals. 
When unemployment rises in a given import substitution sector, government will move to protect 
domestic industries by increasing refusals. Increasing refusals restricts imports and, hence, 
increases demand for domestic produce. Consequently, product price increase and producers in 
turn increase labour demand in order to expand output to take advantage of the higher prices. In 
the end, import refusals will increase when unemployment increases. 
       Although the fruit and vegetable industry constitutes approximately 15 percent of the US 
agricultural sector (US Census Bureau 2012), Calvin and Martin (2010) indicate that it is the 
most labour intensive industry in US agricultural sector. The industry‘s labour demand is at a 
peak during harvesting followed by a substantial layoff afterwards. This makes the industry a 
considerable contributor to fluctuations in agricultural sector unemployment.  Hence, the study 
uses US agricultural sector unemployment as proxy for unemployment in the fruit and vegetable 
(UNEMP) industry due to lack of unemployment data specifically for the fruit and vegetable 
industry. 
       Further, antidumping is also used as a measure of political influence in this study. 
Particularly, domestic firms bring anti-dumping cases (ANTID) against foreign ones as a legal 
means of seeking protection. As such, it is expected that evidence of anti-dumping activity might 
be a signal for regulatory institution to increase protection. Hence, antidumping is expected to 
have a significant positive effect on import refusals, where refusals are politically motivated. 
       Baylis et al (2009) also used lobbying expenditure as a proxy for protectionist motivation on 
the premise that firms spend resources to lobby the government for protection. Hence, an 
increasing lobbying expenditure arising from the fruit and vegetable industry could be an 
indication of the desire for increased protection. Lobbying expenditure is, however, excluded 
from this analysis purely as a result of data limitations. Lobbying expenditure is reported as 
annual data. Hence, converting it from annual to monthly is not possible without the data losing 
its essential properties. Although Baylis et al (2009) converted annual lobbying expenditures to 
monthly observations by matching them with trade data, such a conversion can be expected to 
introduce multicollinearity as a result of the likely correlation between trade values and lobbying 
expenditure. 
       The value of fruit and vegetables imported from a specific country is introduced to control 
for the number of refusals from that country. It is hypothesized that as imports rise, the number 
of products that will genuinely be rejected because they did not comply with US food safety laws 
may increase. This is because as the volume of products destined for export increase, the time 
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spent in screening to eliminate non-complying ones is reduced as a result of the desire to 
dispatch highly perishable fruit and vegetable products to export market in order to avoid losses. 
This could result in lots of non-complying products being carried along only to be rejected at the 
point of entry. Hence, a positive relationship is expected between import refusals and value of 
imports. Where value of imports is not included, the coefficients of the remaining independent 
variables in the equation will overestimate their effects on import refusals. As such, imports from 
Mexico (IMPMEX), imports from Canada (IMPCAN) and imports from China (IMPCHI) are 
introduced into the import refusal equations of Mexico (4.1), Canada (4.2) and China (4.3) 
respectively. The RMEX, RCAN and RCHI are refusals from Mexico, refusals from Canada and 
refusals from China respectively. 
       Further, food safety alerts and recalls in the US (ALERT) is introduced to account for 
genuine concerns for safety. Rising alerts pertaining to fruit and vegetables will increase scrutiny 
in inspection and possibly increase refusals.  Hence, food safety alerts is expected to have a 
positive effect on import refusals.  The import refusal equation for each country is represented 
as: 
 
 
 
 
Where  ,  and   are error terms in equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) respectively. The hypothesis 
of political influence in fruit and vegetable import refusals is tested by estimating and testing the 
significance of the regression coefficients of the unemployment and antidumping variables. 
 
4.3 The data 
       The analysis uses monthly data from October 2001 to December 2011 because data on 
import refusals is only available for this period. Import refusals for Mexico, Canada and China 
were sourced from the FDA and measured as the number of refusals per month. Data on value of 
fruit and vegetables (US$) imported into the US from a country were sourced from US 
Department of Agriculture while unemployment data was obtained from US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The data on antidumping was sourced from the Global Antidumping Database of The 
World Bank and measured as the total  number of antidumping cases brought against fresh fruit 
and vegetable products by US farmers per month.  
 
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
       The descriptive statistics of the data is shown in Table A4.3.1
6
. The average number of 
refusals for Mexico, Canada and China are 46.1626, 7.365854 and 22.85366 respectively.  The 
data reveals minimum refusals per month to be 8, zero (0) and 3 while maximum number of 
refusals per month to be 187, 82 and 100 respectively for Mexico, Canada and China. Moreover, 
                                                          
6
 Table or figure number preceded with the letter ‗A‘ indicates they are in the Appendix. 
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import refusals are positively skewed for each country. This implies that majority of the data 
points are closer to the minimum values. 
       Further, the average import values of fruit and vegetables from Mexico, Canada and China 
per month are approximately US$337million, US$77.5million and US$77million respectively. 
The minimum values of imported fruit and vegetables from Mexico, Canada and China per 
month are about US$63million, US$12.3million and US$1.4million while maximum import 
values are US$805million, US$186million and US$15million respectively. As with refusals, 
import values are positively skewed.  Moreover, there about 4.878 food safety alerts and recalls 
per month in the US. The data shows a minimum of zero (no alerts) and maximum of 45 alerts 
cases per month. Food safety alert is positively skewed. 
       The average, minimum and maximum agricultural sector unemployment rates in the US are 
10.28195 percent, 2.4 percent and 21.3 percent respectively. Unemployment data is positively 
skewed implying that majority of the data points is closer to the lower tail.  In the case of 
antidumping, there are about 0.373984 antidumping cases against fresh fruit and vegetable 
products per month. The data ranges from minimum of no antidumping to a maximum of 2 
antidumping activities per month. Antidumping is positively skewed.  
 
4.3.2 Seasonal influence in monthly data 
       Agricultural monthly data may be subject to seasonal influence emanating from weather 
conditions or the behavior of economic agents (Schulze 2009). Seasonal influences, if present, 
must be removed because regressions involving seasonality can produce spurious estimates. As 
shown in Fig A4.3.2.1, Fig A4.3.2.2, Fig A4.3.2.3, Fig A4.3.2.4, Fig A4.3.2.5, Fig A4.3.2.6, Fig 
A4.3.2.7 and Fig A4.3.2.8, the fluctuations of the line graphs indicates the possibility of 
seasonality which need to be tested for. All variables are transformed into logarithms accept 
antidumping. This is because more than half of the months had zero (0) antidumping cases. Since 
the logarithm of a zero is not defined, those values would have to be adjusted, if in logarithms, 
thereby decreasing the sample size substantially.  
 
4.3.3 HEGY test for seasonal unit roots  
       An econometric test for seasonal influence is a test for seasonal unit roots in the data 
(Greene 2003; Schulze 2009). This is done using a HEGY test. For a time series variable yt, 
Schulze (2009) maintains that seasonal unit roots is tested for by estimating and testing for the 
significance of the coefficients (γi and ) of the equation (4.4) below. 
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According to Schulze (2009, p. 6, 7)
7
: 
β0 is the constant, t is the deterministic trend and di represents seasonal dummies, where dit = 1 if t 
corresponds to month i and 0 otherwise. The zi ‘s cover non-singular linear transformations of lagged 
values of yt 
The t and di coefficients test for deterministic seasonal pattern. These are reduced to zero where 
seasonality does not follow a deterministic pattern.  The hypotheses of seasonal unit roots at 
different monthly frequencies are stated in Table 4.3.3 below. With the exception of , which 
tests for regular unit roots, all other pi (π) test for seasonal unit roots8.  
 
Table 4.3.3 Statement of hypotheses 
Test Null hypothesis Alternate hypothesis 
T –test (t1) π1=0: Unit roots at 0 frequency  No unit roots 
T–test (t2) π2 = 0: Seasonal unit roots at 2
nd
 frequency No seasonal unit roots  
F-Test (F34) π3 = π4 = 0: Seasonal unit roots at 3
rd
 and 4
th
 frequency No seasonal unit roots 
F-Test (F56) π5 = π6 = 0:Seasonal unit roots at 5
th
 and 6
th
 frequency No seasonal unit roots  
F-test (F78) π7 = π8 = 0: Seasonal unit roots at 7
th
 and 8
th
 frequency No seasonal unit roots  
F-test(F910) π9 = π10 = 0:Seasonal unit roots at 9
th
 and 10
th
 frequency No seasonal unit roots  
F-test(F1112) π11 = π12 = 0:Seasonal unit root at 11
th
 and 12
th
 frequency No seasonal unit roots 
F-test (F1-12) π1 =…= π12 = 0: Unit root or seasonal unit root present No unit/seasonal unit 
roots  
F-test(F2-12) π2 =…= π12 = 0: Seasonal unit root present No seasonal unit roots  
 
 
 
4.3.3.1 HEGY test results 
       The results of the seasonal unit root test are summarized in Table 4.3.3.1. Intercept, trend 
and seasonal dummies were included in the deterministic part of the HEGY equation for each 
variable. The t-statistic of pi1 ( ) for each variable is not significant. Hence we accept the null 
hypothesis that refusals from Canada, refusals from Mexico, refusals from China, imports from 
Canada, imports from China, imports from Mexico,  unemployment, alerts and antidumping have 
regular unit roots. 
       Further, the t-statistic of pi-two (п2) for each variable is not significant with the exception of 
antidumping. This suggests that each of the variables has seasonal unit root at the second 
frequency apart from antidumping. Moreover, with the exception of antidumping, the joint F-
statistic (F34) for each variable is not significant implying that each variable has seasonal unit 
roots at the third and fourth frequencies.  
                                                          
7
 Details of Zi‘s transformation are shown in Franses (1991, p.202). 
8
 For critical values of HEGY Test, refer to Franses and Hobijn (1997, pp.25-47) 
25 
 
     In conclusion, RMEX, RCAN, RCHI, IMPMEX, IMPCAN, IMPCHI, UNEMP and ALERT 
have seasonal unit roots at second frequency (t2) and at third and fourth frequency (F34) in 
addition to regular unit roots.  Antidumping, on the other hand, only has regular unit roots.  
 
Table 4.3.3.1 HEGY test for seasonal unit roots 
Test RCAN 
(L=10) 
RMEX 
(L=10) 
RCHI 
(L=10) 
IMPMEX 
(L=8) 
IMPCAN 
(L=8) 
IMPCHI 
(L=6) 
UNEMP 
(L=4) 
ALERT 
(L=6) 
ANTID 
(L=2) 
 
0.5064 0.1126 1.2391 1.3759 1.0225 1.1160 0.1126 0.9181 1.5005 
 
-0.6396 0.2714 1.2412 1.4218 1.1289 1.3102 -0.2714 1.4724 2.8838*** 
F34 0.6783 0.3270 1.5107 1.6470 1.2616 1.2800 0.3070 1.5910 4.2824*** 
F56 7.8759*** 8.3253*** 9.0227*** 11.0238*** 4.4859*** 4.2045*** 8.3253*** 10.0559*** 11.0451*** 
F78 2.9496*** 6.3610*** 5.8502*** 7.5081*** 3.7523*** 3.6110** 6.3610*** 7.9993*** 5.1307*** 
F910 7.3821*** 9.2316*** 7.2682*** 8.4432*** 6.3491*** 3.6057** 9.2316*** 12.4790*** 8.7349*** 
F1112 5.2661*** 6.9208*** 8.0226*** 10.4511*** 3.9740*** 4.2364*** 6.9208** 9.2902*** 8.0680** 
F1-12 6.1235*** 4.625*** 4.7958*** 7.1235*** 5.3763*** 5.0660*** 4.625*** 7.0273*** 11.4832*** 
F2-12 7.2378*** 5.0150*** 4.7717*** 7.2926*** 5.3424*** 5.0109*** 5.0150*** 6.8568*** 12.1370*** 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively. L is number of lags included 
 
4.3.4 Johansen cointegration test  
       The HEGY test results indicate that the data is not stationary in levels but stationary after 
first differencing. This could pose a challenge because regressions with non-stationary data can 
lead to spurious regressions. However, if the residual from a time series regression of non-
stationary data is stationary, then the regression is no longer spurious but represents the true 
long-run relationship between the variables (i.e. the variables cointegrate). Hence, we use the 
Johansen cointegration test to check for long-run relationships between the variables. 
      Since π1, π2, π3 and π4 are not rejected as indicated by the HEGY test, the appropriate filter 
for regular unit roots would have been (1-L
4
). However, regular unit roots are not removed 
because their removal will defeat the essence for cointegration test. Further, although the HEGY 
test suggests that both stochastic and deterministic seasonal unit roots are present, seasonality is 
assumed to follow a deterministic pattern. As such, the deterministic seasonality is addressed by 
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including 12-monthly seasonal dummies in the cointegration model. Stochastic seasonality is 
deferred for future research. 
      The Johansen cointegration test uses two criteria: the Trace Statistic and Maximum 
Eigenvalue criterion. The Trace-Test tests the null hypothesis that the number of cointegration 
equations is less than or equal to r (= 0 to n) versus the alternative that there is no cointegration. 
The Maximum Eigenvalue, on the other hand, tests the null hypothesis of n distinct cointegration 
equations against the alternative of n+1 (Greene 2003; Skrabic and Tomic-Plazibat 2009). 
       We test for cointegration under the assumption that the deterministic component has only 
intercept, both intercept and trend and neither intercept nor trend using seasonally adjusted data 
(arising from seasonal unit root test). A test for cointegration was done by including variables in 
a specific equation.  Hence, in Table A4.3.4.1, the variables included are those present in the 
import refusals equation for Mexico. The value of imports from Canada and China are excluded 
because we are testing for cointegration between variables that define import refusals from 
Mexico. Similarly, in Table A4.3.4.2, only the value of imports from Canada (IMPCAN) was 
included while value of imports from China (IMPCHI) was included in Table A4.3.4.3.  
       The results of the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace statistic are each significant at the zero 
cointegration rank. This shows that there is one cointegration equation between variables that 
define import refusals from Mexico (Table A4.3.4.1). Similarly, the Maximum Eigenvalue and 
Trace statistic again shows one cointegration equation between variables that define import 
refusals from Canada (Table A4.3.4.2) and finally, the Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace statistic 
shows one cointegration equation between variables that define import refusals from China 
(Table A4.3.4.3). 
 
4.4 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
       Since the Johansen cointegration test indicates that there is cointegration between the 
variables, this implies that there is a long-run relationship between the variables. Hence, 
estimating import refusal equations as in equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) will underestimate the 
relationship between the variables since it fails to capture the long-run component. To capture 
this, the equations are re-specified and estimated using the Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM). The VECM estimates the long-run and short-run relationship between the variables, as 
well as estimating the speed at which the short-run coefficients adjust to the long-run (Greene 
2003; Madalla and Kim 2000). The condensed VEC model can be written as: 
 
(Skrabic and Tomic-Plazibat 2009) 
Where: 
 is an n x 1 vector of endogenous variables  
 is a nx1 vector of stochastic disturbances  
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  has a rank equivalent to the number of distinct cointegration equations and decomposed as   
, where: 
β is a n x r matrix of cointegration relationship parameters   
α is a n x r matrix of speed of adjustment coefficients  
(Greene 2003; Skrabic and Tomic-Plazibat 2009). 
       The full VECM specification equations for import refusals for Mexico, Canada and China 
are shown in equations (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8) respectively. The component of the equation in 
brackets is the long-run relations and the component outside the brackets is the short-run. ,  
and  represent the speed at which the short-run component adjust to the long-run in equations 
(4.6), (4.7) and (4.8) respectively. 
 
 
 
 
       The seasonally adjusted data (using seasonal dummies) were used in the VEC model 
estimation. In the VEC model estimation, every variable is automatically differenced once. 
Hence, to get rid of the unit roots in the seasonally adjusted data, all variables were incorporated 
at their un-differenced state for the model to automatically difference them once to remove all 
regular unit roots. 
 
4.5 Results 
       The results for import refusals are discussed separately for Mexico, Canada and China 
below.  
 
4.5.1 Import refusals from Mexico 
       The VECM included one lag as suggested by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SC), Final Predictor Error (FPE) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
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(HQ) (Table A4.5.1.1)
9
. The estimated VECM of import refusals for Mexico is shown in Table 
A4.5.1.2. Although the joint probability of Jacque-Bera statistics
10
 (689.7945) is significant, it is 
however not significant with respect to the first component of Table A4.5.1.3, where refusals 
from Mexico is a dependent variable. Hence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of normally 
distributed error terms. Besides, the LM
11
 statistic (Table A4.5.1.4) and White 
Heteroskedasticity
12
 statistic (Table A4.5.1.5) are not significant indicating that there are no 
spherical disturbances in the model. The F-statistic is significant at 1 percent implying that 
independent variables jointly explain the variations in the model.      
  
4.5.1.1 Long-run effects of import refusals from Mexico 
       The long-run relationship between import refusals from Mexico, unemployment, value of 
fruit and vegetables imported from Mexico, food safety alerts and antidumping is the 
cointegration equation of the estimated VECM for Mexico (Table 4.5.1.1). The results show that 
in the long-run, import refusals from Mexico are explained by US agricultural sector 
unemployment, food safety alerts and the value of fruit and vegetables imported from Mexico. 
       Value of fruit and vegetables imported from Mexico has a positive effect on import refusals. 
It is also significant at 1 percent. The positive relationship between value of fruit and vegetables 
imported from Mexico and import refusals implies that refusals increase with increasing imports. 
This is because when the quantity of fruit and vegetables destined for export increase, the time 
spent in screening the products to eliminate the non-complying ones is reduced. As a result, the 
number of products rejected for non-compliance increase with increasing volume of imports. The 
results suggest that a 1 percent rise in value of fruit and vegetables imported from Mexico will 
increase import refusals by 10.39 percent in the long-run.  
       Food safety alerts have a positive effect on import refusals in the long-run and it is 
significant at 1 percent. There is a positive relationship between food safety alerts and import 
refusals because when alerts are issued, FDA agents are prompted to thoroughly inspect imports. 
This increases the chance of finding a non-complying product. In the event that one is found, the 
entire truckload or container is rejected. In the long-run, refusals will tend to rise as food safety 
alerts increase. The results show that a 1 percent rise in food safety alerts will increase import 
refusals from Mexico by 2.39 percent. 
       The US agricultural sector unemployment (measuring political influence) has a significant 
(10 percent significance level) effect on import refusals in the long-run. Unemployment has a 
positive effect on import refusals as expected. Since fruit and vegetables are a labour intensive 
                                                          
9
 Information criteria suggest the number of months the model must be lagged 
10
 The Jacque-Bera tests the null hypothesis that error terms are normally distributed. Error terms must be normally 
distributed for the research results to be generalizable. 
11
 LM test for serial correlation. Serial correlation tests the null hypothesis that error terms from one time period is 
not correlated with another time period. Serial correlation exists when the error terms correlate and it causes 
estimated standard errors to become smaller. Hence serial correlation can lead to the situation where one is likely to 
reject the null-hypothesis when it should not be rejected 
12
Heteroskedasticity tests the null hypothesis that variance of error terms are same for the entire sample against the 
alternate that variance varies along the sample size. LM and White Heteroskedasticity test constitute a test for 
spherical disturbances  
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industry with seasonal labour demand, labour demand increases during harvesting and decrease 
afterwards. Hence, agricultural sector unemployment increases during the production season and 
decline after harvesting time. Consequently, a rise in agricultural sector unemployment in the US 
arises to a considerable degree from the fruit and vegetable industry. In the event that the 
government decides to protect job losses in agriculture, a greater effort has to be geared towards 
stabilizing employment in the fruit and vegetable industry.  Under the current WTO 
commitments whereby quantitative restriction is limited, tacit manipulation of imports might be 
anticipated. This results in an increase in import refusals as unemployment increases in 
agricultural sector. The results indicate that a 1 percent rise in agricultural sector unemployment 
in the US will increase import refusals from Mexico by 3.35 percent in the long-run. 
       Antidumping has a positive effect on import refusals in the long-run. It is, however, not 
significant. The direct relationship between antidumping and import refusals confirms the 
proposition that when antidumping is initiated against imported products (i.e. seeking direct 
protection against foreign completion), officials are lobbied to increase protection. However, 
antidumping may not be significant in explaining import refusals from Mexico in the long-run as 
a result of the low level of antidumping activity observed in the analysis.  
 
 
Table 4.5.1.1 Long-run effects of import refusals from Mexico 
       Variable coefficient Standard error t-statistic 
 1.0000   
 10.3860 1.1979 8.6696*** 
 3.3525 1.1467 2.9236* 
 2.3934 0.4429 5.4039*** 
 0.6348 0.5836 1.0877 
 0.0333   
 82.219   
***, ** and * are significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
 
4.5.1.2 Short-run effects of import refusal from Mexico 
       The short-run relationship is captured by the error correction component of the VEC model 
(Table 4.5.1.2). In the short-run, import refusals from Mexico are explained by past refusals from 
Mexico, value of fruit and vegetables imported from Mexico, food safety alerts and antidumping. 
       In the short-run, past import refusals from Mexico (lagged by 1 month) have a negative 
effect on current refusals. Past import refusals is significant at 10 percent. This may be due to the 
fact that as a country‘s imports begin to face rising rejection, importers identify and address the 
reasons associated with rejection to subsequently decrease future refusals. The results show that 
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a 1 percent increase in past refusals will decrease current refusals from Mexico by 0.47 percent in 
the long-run. 
       The value of fruit and vegetable imported from Mexico has a positive effect on import 
refusals from Mexico and it is significant at 10 percent. The positive relationship between value 
of fruit and vegetables imported from Mexico and import refusals suggest that refusals will 
increase when imports increase. As in the long run case, when import volumes rise the time spent 
on screening to eliminate non-complying ones is reduced. This allows more non-complying 
products to be shipped for export only to be rejected at the border. Sometimes, the whole 
truckload or container is rejected if one non-complying item is found. Eventually, the number of 
refusals will increase as imports increase. The results show that a 1 percent rise in value of fruit 
and vegetables imported from Mexico will increase refusals from Mexico by 0.46 percent in the 
short-run. 
       Food safety alerts have a significant (at 10 percent) positive effect on import refusals. The 
positive relationship between food safety alerts and import refusals from Mexico indicates that 
refusals will increase when the government issues more food safety alerts. This is because alerts 
tend to prompt officials to check food products more thoroughly than they would have done if 
there were no alerts. The results show that a 1 percent rise in food safety alerts will increase 
refusals from Mexico by about 0.059 percent. 
       Agricultural sector unemployment in the US (measuring political influence) has no 
significant effect on import refusals from Mexico in the short-run although it bears the expected 
positive sign.  This is because unemployment usually rises gradually rather than showing a 
sudden increase. Hence, officials may not be prompted until unemployment figures become 
alarmingly high which explains why refusals do not immediately respond to changes in 
unemployment in the short run. 
       Antidumping (as a measure of political influence) has a positive effect on import refusals 
from Mexico in the short-run. Antidumping is also significant at 1 percent. This confirms the 
hypothesis that when antidumping activity is initiated against imported products (i.e. seeking 
direct protection against foreign competition), officials are lobbied to increase protection. 
Further, Mexico is a low cost producer of fruit and vegetables by virtue of its climatic condition, 
which allows all year round production coupled with relative cheap labour (Calvin and Martin 
2010). This could create the perception among the US farmers that Mexican producers may 
engage in predatory pricing. In this regard, when an antidumping activity is initiated against fruit 
and vegetables, government may well be lobbied to increase protection through import refusals 
which can explain the significant relationship between import refusals and antidumping. 
       The short-run adjustment coefficient (-0.024460) has a negative sign. The short-run 
adjustment coefficient is significant at 10 percent. This suggests that the model corrects about 
2.44 percent per month of any increase in refusals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 4.5.1.2 Short-run effects of import refusals from Mexico 
       Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic 
 
-0.02446 0.01172 -2.0871* 
 -0.46603 0.08522 5.46832* 
 0.45576 0.17163 2.65546* 
 0.07551 0.20569 0.36712 
  0.0588 0.02189 2.68652* 
  1.2074 0.21121 5.7167*** 
 2.70E-05 0.00064 0.04184 
 -0.0018 0.04585 -0.04055 
***, ** and * are significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
 
4.5.2 Import refusals from Canada  
       The VECM included one lag as suggested by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SC), Final Predictor Error (FPE) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
(HQ) (Table A4.5.2.1)
13
. The estimated VECM of import refusals for Canada is shown in Table 
A4.5.2.2. Although the joint probability of Jacque-Bera statistics
14
 (856.3214) is significant, it is, 
however, not significant with respect to component 1 of Table A4.5.2.3, where import refusals 
from Canada is the dependent variable. Hence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of normally 
distributed error terms. Besides, the LM
15
 statistic (Table A4.5.2.4) and White 
Heteroskedasticity
16
 statistic (Table A4.5.2.5) are not significant indicating that there are no 
spherical disturbances in the model. The F-statistic is significant at 5 percent implying that the 
independent variables jointly explain variations in the model.      
 
 
                                                          
13
 Information criteria indicates the number of months the model must be lagged 
14
 The Jacque-Bera test tests the null hypothesis that the error terms are normally distributed. Error terms must be 
normally distributed for the research results to be generalizable. 
15
 LM test for serial correlation. Serial correlation tests the null hypothesis that error terms from one time period is 
not correlated with another time period. Serial correlation exists when the error terms correlate and it causes 
estimated standard errors to become smaller. Hence serial correlation can lead to the situation where one is likely to 
reject the null-hypothesis when it should not be rejected 
16
Heteroskedasticity test the null hypothesis that variance of error terms are same for the entire sample against the 
general alternate that variance of error term varies along the sample size. LM and White Heteroskedasticity test 
constitute a test for spherical disturbances  
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4.5.2.1 Long-run effects of import refusals from Canada 
 
       The long-run relationship between import refusals from Canada, value of fruit and 
vegetables imported from Canada, US agricultural sector unemployment, food safety alerts and 
antidumping is the estimated cointegration equation of the VECM for Canada (Table 4.5.2.1). 
The results show that, in the long-run, US agricultural sector unemployment, value of fruit and 
vegetables imported from Canada and food safety alerts explain import refusals from Canada. 
       The value of fruit and vegetables imported from Canada has a positive effect on import 
refusals from Canada in the long-run. It is also significant at 1 percent. The positive relationship 
between value of fruit and vegetables imported from Canada and import refusals confirms the 
hypothesis that non-complying products rise with increasing imports. This is because, when 
imports rise, the time spent in screening products from production site before exporting is 
reduced. This tends to increase the number of non-complying products which get rejected at the 
border. The results show that a 1 percent rise in value of fruit and vegetables imported from 
Canada will increase import refusals from Canada by 1.63 percent in the long-run. 
       Food safety alerts have a significant (5 percent significance level) positive effect on import 
refusals. The results show that a 1 percent increase in food safety alerts will increase import 
refusals from Canada by 0.27 percent. The safety of Canadian fruit and vegetables is of concern 
to US consumers as Canada is one of the largest sources of imports. Hence, it is likely that when 
alerts are issued, inspection of fruit and vegetables from Canada will be intensified to prevent 
any potential food safety hazards from getting into US. 
       Agricultural sector unemployment in the US (measuring political influence) has a positive 
effect on import refusals as expected. Agricultural sector unemployment is significant at 10 
percent. Since fruit and vegetable is a labour intensive industry with seasonal labour demand, 
changes in unemployment across the agricultural sector tends to arise to a considerable degree 
from the fruit and vegetable industry. As such, government‘s intervention to protect job losses in 
agricultural sector could lead to a greater focus on the fruit and vegetable industry. In this regard, 
protection may be increased in the fruit and vegetable industry by increasing import refusals, 
which reflects the direct relationship between import refusals and agricultural sector 
unemployment. This conforms to Baylis et al (2009)‘s finding that declines in employment in a 
given import-substitution sector increases import refusals. The results suggest that a 1 percent 
increase in unemployment will increase Canadian import refusals by 1.28 percent in the long-
run. 
       Antidumping, on the other hand, has no significant effect on import refusals in the long-run 
although a positive relationship exist between antidumping and import refusals from Canada. 
The positive relationship between import refusals and antidumping confirms the expectation that 
refusals will usually increase when domestic producers request an antidumping investigation.  
Since antidumping is regarded as wake-up call on the government to come to the aid of domestic 
firms against unfair foreign competition, officials may be lobbied to restrict product entry at the 
same time. However, antidumping is probably not significant in the long-run because of fairly 
small number of antidumping cases noted over the study period. A large sample size is preferred 
in long-run analysis. Further, Canada serves as the largest export market for US fruit and 
vegetable producers. Hence, attempts to manipulate import refusals when an antidumping case 
has already been made could trigger retaliation and possibly jeopardise access to the Canadian 
market. In any event, antidumping did not have a significant effect on import refusals from 
Canada. 
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Table 4.5.2.1 Long-run effects of import refusals from Canada 
       Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic 
 1.0000   
 1.633905 0.21239  7.69306*** 
 1.282111 0.23797  5.38775*** 
 0.267799 0.08610  3.11036** 
 0.103433 0.07233  1.43005 
 0.007018   
 -13.00450   
***, ** and * are significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
 
4.5.2.2 Short-run effects of import refusals from Canada 
       The Table 4.5.2.2 reports the short-run estimates of import refusals for Canada. In the short-
run, import refusals from Canada are explained by value of fruit and vegetables imported from 
Canada and food safety alerts. Past import refusals from Canada has an inverse relationship with 
current refusals although it is not significant. This implies that when refusals rise, 
exporters/importers identify and address the reason for the incident in order to ensure that in 
future imports are not impeded by refusals. 
      The value of fruit and vegetable imported from Canada has a positive effect on import 
refusals from Canada in the short-run and it is significant at 10 percent. As in the long-run, the 
positive relationship between value of imports and refusals confirms the hypothesis that the 
number of non-complying products will rise whenever imports rise. This is because, when 
imports rise, the time spent on screening products at production sites before exporting is reduced. 
This tends to increase the number of non-complying products entering the export supply chain, 
which subsequently get rejected at the border. The results show that a 1 percent rise in imports 
will increase import refusals by 0.63 percent. 
       Food safety alerts has a significant (10 percent significance) positive effect on import 
refusals from Canada in the short-run. The model predicts that a 1 percent rise in food safety 
alerts will increase import refusals from Canada about 0.15 percent in the short-run. The positive 
relationship between food safety alerts and import refusals arise because, when alerts are issued, 
officials intensify inspection to prevent any unsafe food from getting into US. This increases the 
chance of finding non-complying products, which consequently increase import refusals. 
       Agricultural sector unemployment in the US (measuring political influence) has no 
significant effect on import refusals from Canada in the short-run.  This is partly because 
unemployment usually rises gradually rather than showing a sudden increase. As such officials 
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may not be prompted until unemployment figures become alarmingly high and, hence, import 
refusals in response to unemployment may be muted. 
       Further, although antidumping has a positive effect on import refusals from Canada as 
expected, it is not significant. The direct effect between import refusals and antidumping 
confirms the expectation that refusals will usually increase when domestic producers request an 
antidumping investigation.  This could be the case because antidumping is a call on the 
government to protect domestic firms against unfair foreign competition which the government 
responds to by increasing refusals. Although Canada is the second largest exporter of fruit and 
vegetables to US, production is limited by climatic condition to at most four months in a year. 
For most parts of the year and for some vegetables, production is undertaken in greenhouses.  
Greenhouse production makes Canada a high cost producer and therefore decreases the 
likelihood that firms will undertake predatory pricing, which is a condition antidumping. Further, 
as in the long-run, since Canada is the second largest export market for US fruit and vegetables, 
manipulating Canadian imports in the glare of an antidumping investigation could trigger 
retaliation and jeopardise access to Canadian market. In any case, antidumping tend to have no 
significant effect on import refusals from Canada. 
       The short-run adjustment coefficient (-0.769446) is significant (at 5 percent) with a negative 
effect as expected. This suggests that the model corrects about 76.94 percent of any increase in 
import refusals per month. 
 
 
Table 4.5.2.2 Short-run effects of import refusals from Canada 
       Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic 
 
-0.769446 0.13377 -5.75217** 
 -0.014259 0.10299 -0.13845 
 0.629207 0.23799 2.64389* 
 0.122241 0.34953 0.34973 
 0.14579 0.06150 2.3705* 
 0.138696 0.14668 0.94557 
 7.38E-05 0.00108 0.00430 
 -0.000330 0.07679 -0.00868 
***, ** and * are significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
 
 
35 
 
4.5.3 Import refusals from China 
       The VECM included one lag as suggested by Akaike Information Criterion, Schwarz 
Information Criterion, Final Predictor Error and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (Table 
A4.5.3.1)
17
. The estimated VECM of import refusals for China is shown in Table A4.5.3.2. 
Although the joint probability of Jacque-Bera statistics
18
 (824.3441) is significant, it is however 
not significant with respect to component 1 of Table A4.5.3.3, where refusals from China is the 
dependent variable. Hence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of normally distributed error 
terms. Besides, the LM
19
 statistic (Table A4.5.3.4) and White Heteroskedasticity
20
 statistic 
(Table A4.5.3.5) are not significant indicating that there are no spherical disturbances in the 
model. The F-statistic is significant at 1 percent and, therefore, suggests that the independent 
variables jointly explain the variations in the model. 
 
4.5.3.1 Long-run effects of import refusals from China 
       The cointegration coefficients indicate the long-run determinants of import refusals from 
China (Table 4.5.3.1). The results show that the value of fruit and vegetables imported from 
China, food safety alerts and US agricultural sector unemployment explain import refusals from 
China in the long-run.  
       The value of fruit and vegetables imported from China has a significant (at 1 percent) 
positive effect on import refusals from China. The results show that a 1 percent rise in value fruit 
and vegetables imported from China will increase the associated import refusals by 37.07 
percent. The positive relationship between value of fruit and vegetables imported from China and 
import refusals confirms the hypothesis that refusals will increase when imports increase. This is 
because with higher volumes of product to export, time spent on product screening to eliminate 
non-complying ones before exporting is reduced. As such, the number of non-complying 
products associated with imports will rise as imports rise.  
       Further, food safety alerts have the expected positive effect on import refusals from China 
and it is significant at 1 percent. There is a positive relationship between food safety alerts and 
import refusals because when alerts increase FDA officials intensify inspection to prevent any 
unsafe food from getting into US. This consequently leads to increase refusals when alerts 
increase. The results show that 1 percent rise in food safety alerts will increase import refusals 
from China by 6.31 percent in the long-run. 
       Agricultural sector unemployment in the US (measuring political influence) has a direct 
relationship with import refusals although it is not significant. Since fruit and vegetables are a 
labour intensive industry with seasonal labour demand, a general rise in unemployment across 
                                                          
17
 Information criteria indicates the number of months the model must be lagged 
18
 The Jacque-Bera test tests the null hypothesis that the error terms are normally distributed. Error terms must be 
normally distributed for the research results to be generalizable. 
19
 LM test for serial correlation. Serial correlation tests the null hypothesis that error terms from one time period is 
not correlated with another time period. Serial correlation exists when the error terms correlate and it causes 
estimated standard errors to become smaller. Hence serial correlation can lead to the situation where one is likely to 
reject the null-hypothesis when it should not be rejected 
20
Heteroskedasticity test the null hypothesis that variance of error terms are same for the entire sample against the 
general alternate that variance of error term varies along the sample size. LM and White Heteroskedasticity test 
constitute a test for spherical disturbances  
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the agricultural sector tends to arise to a considerable degree from the fruit and vegetable 
industry. As such, government‘s intervention to protect seasonal increases in agricultural sector 
unemployment may bring forth a greater focus on the fruit and vegetable industry. In this regard, 
protection may be accomplished in fruit and vegetable industry by increasing import refusals, 
which reflects the direct relationship between import refusals and agricultural sector 
unemployment. 
       Antidumping, on the other hand, has no significant effect on import refusals in the long-run 
although it has the expected positive effect on import refusals. The positive relationship between 
import refusals and antidumping confirms the expectation that refusals will usually increase 
when domestic producers request an antidumping investigation.  However, antidumping may not 
be significant in the long-run in this model because of the small number of cases observed. 
      In summary, antidumping and agricultural sector unemployment are not significant in 
explaining import refusals from China. The model therefore suggests that import refusals from 
China are not politically influenced in the long-run. A possible argument for this may be that 
China is a relatively smaller supplier of fruit and vegetables in the US market compared to major 
exporters such as Mexico and Canada. China‘s long distance from US reduces its ability to 
supply fresh produce relative to Mexico and Canada. As such, Chinese exports over the years 
may not have been perceived as a threat to the US fruit and vegetable industry to the same degree 
as Canadian and Mexican products. Hence, China‘s exports did not need to be politically 
restrained to protect the domestic producers. Rather, the significance of food safety alerts 
variable implies that US public is concerned about the safety of Chinese fruit and vegetables 
rather than their economic competitiveness.   
 
Table 4.5.3.1 Long-run effects of import refusals from China 
       Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic 
 
1.0000   
 
37.07205 5.82129 6.36836*** 
 
0.2641 0.41284 1.56321 
 
6.308861 2.27896 2.76831** 
 
0.056059 1.97333 0.02841 
 
0.248285   
 
-260.4409   
***, ** and * are significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
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4.5.3.2 Short-run effects of import refusals from China 
       In the short-run, import refusals are explained by past import refusals from China, value of 
fruit and vegetables imported from China and food safety alerts. Past Chinese import refusals 
have a significant (1 percent significance level) negative effect on import refusals. This implies 
that when previous refusals are substantial, potential exporters/importers take more stringent 
measures to identify and address the causes of rejection to ensure that future rejections are 
reduced. The results show that a 1 percent increase in past import refusals from China will 
decrease current import refusals by 0.49 percent in the short-run. 
       Food safety alerts have a positive effect on import refusals from China. It is significant at 5 
percent. This again indicates that the US is more concerned about the safety of Chinese products 
than their competitiveness, especially given recent food scares that have been associated with 
some Chinese foods (Patience 2011). The results suggest that a 1 percent increase in food safety 
alerts will increase import refusals by 0.08 percent. 
       Agricultural sector unemployment in the US and antidumping (both measuring political 
influence) are not significant although they exhibit the expected direct relationship with import 
refusals in the short-run. As in the long-run, a possible argument for this is because China is a 
relatively smaller exporter of fresh fruits and vegetables to US compared to major exporters such 
as Mexico, Canada and Chile. China‘s long distance from the US reduces its ability to supply 
fresh produce to US relative to Mexico and Canada. As such, Chinese exports over the years may 
not have been perceived as a threat to US fruit and vegetable industry to the same degree as 
Canadian and Mexican products and, hence, did not need to be politically restrained to protect 
the domestic producers. Rather, the significance of food safety alerts suggests that the US public 
is more concerned about the safety of Chinese fruit and vegetables rather than their economic 
competitiveness.   
       Further, the coefficient of adjustment (-0.015008) is negative and significant (5 percent 
level) as expected. This suggests that the model corrects about 1.5 percent per month of any 
previous increase in import refusals.  
 
Table 4.5.3.2 Short-run effect of import refusals from China 
       Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic 
 
-0.015008 0.00467 -3.2137** 
 -0.494332 0.08278 -5.97197*** 
 0.075918 0.03280 2.3145* 
 0.327921 0.23134 1.41747 
 0.082215 0.02489 3.3031** 
 0.134666 0.10240 1.31507 
 0.000161 0.00075 0.21344 
 0.025301 0.05369  0.47121 
***, ** and * are significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
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4.5.4 Summary  
       The results of political influence in fruit and vegetable import refusals are summarised 
below in sub-sections for Mexico, Canada and China. 
 
4.5.4.1 Import refusals from Mexico 
 
       Refusals from Mexico are explained by antidumping, agricultural sector unemployment in 
the US, food safety alerts and the value of fruit and vegetables imported from Mexico.  The 
results show that rising fruit and vegetable imports from Mexico leads to rise in import refusals 
in both long-run and short-run. Food safety alerts have a significant positive effect on import 
refusals. As such, when food safety alerts are increased, refusals from Mexico rise as well. This 
might be due to intensified inspection of all foods when alerts are issued in order to eliminate 
any potential hazard associated with imports. The results also show that when antidumping cases 
brought against fruit and vegetable rise, import refusals from Mexico increase in the short-run. 
Antidumping does not affect import refusals in the long-run and this might be attributed to the 
generally low level of antidumping activity observed. US agricultural sector unemployment, on 
the other hand, has a significant positive effect on import refusals only in the long run. The 
results show that a 1 percent rise in agricultural sector unemployment will increase import 
refusal about 3.35 percent in the long-run.  
 
4.5.4.2 Import refusals from Canada 
 
       The results indicate that import refusals from Canada are explained by unemployment, the 
value of fruit and vegetables imported from Canada and the number of food safety alerts issued 
in the US. In the long-run, food safety alert have a significant positive effect on import refusals. 
The results show that a 1 percent increase in food safety alerts will increase import refusals about 
0.26 percent in the long-run. Further, a 1 percent rise in food safety alerts increases import 
refusals by 0.15 percent in the short-run. Rising fruit and vegetable import values from Canada 
leads to an increase in import refusals. This may be because, when import volumes increase, time 
spent on inspecting products before they are dispatched for export is reduced. As such, non-
complying products associated with imports increase which subsequently gets rejected at the 
border. 
       Agricultural sector unemployment in the US has a significant positive effect on import 
refusals in the long-run. This is particularly the case because fruit and vegetables contribute 
significantly to unemployment in agriculture as a result of seasonal labour demand. Hence, 
during off seasons, labour is laid off and then re-hired during production. The government‘s 
attempts to fight unemployment in agriculture therefore require action in the fruit and vegetable 
industry. As it is an import substitution industry, government‘s interventions to protect jobs can 
come from restricting imports. This can explain the direct relationship between import refusals 
and agricultural sector unemployment. The model predicts that a 1 percent increase in 
unemployment will increase import refusal by 1.28 percent in the long-run. Antidumping, on the 
other hand, has a positive effect on import refusals both in the long-run and short-run but it is not 
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significant. This may be due to the limited antidumping activity observed. It could also be 
because Canada provides the largest export market for US fruit and vegetable farmers. Hence, 
any attempt to manipulate imports in the glare of an antidumping investigation might trigger 
retaliation and jeopardize US access to the Canadian market.   
 
4.5.4.3 Import rrefusals from China 
       Past import refusals from China, the value of fruit and vegetables imported from China and 
the number of food safety alerts explains import refusals from China. Food safety alerts 
positively affect refusals from China, both in the short-run and long-run. This is because when 
alerts are issued, FDA officials may step up inspection rigor to prevent any unsafe food from 
entering the US, which leads to increase refusals. The results show that 1 percent rise in food 
safety alerts will increase refusals by 6.3 percent and 0.08 percent in the short-and long-run 
respectively.  Rising fruit and vegetable imports from China leads to an increase in import 
refusals. Imports have a direct relationship with refusals because, it may be that when volumes 
destined for exports increase the time spent on screening the products is reduced. This leads to 
more non-complying products being left undetected only to be rejected at the border. 
       Neither antidumping nor unemployment are significant in explaining import refusals from 
China. A possible argument may be that China is a relatively smaller exporter of fresh fruits and 
vegetables compared to major exporters such as Mexico, Canada and Chile. China‘s long 
distance from US reduces its ability to supply fresh produce to US relative to Mexico and 
Canada. As such, Chinese exports over the years may not have been perceived as a threat to the 
US fruit and vegetable sector to the same degree as Canadian and Mexican exports. Hence, 
China‘s exports did not need to be politically restrained to protect the domestic producers. 
Rather, the significance of the food safety alerts variable may imply that the US is more 
concerned about the safety of Chinese fruit and vegetables rather than their economic 
competitiveness. 
       Having examined import refusals for political influence, the next chapter examines the trend 
in Salmonella foodborne disease incidence as a justification for the FSMA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
Chapter 5: Prima facie Justification for New Regulations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
       This chapter presents the methodology, results and discussions pertaining to evidence of 
foodborne diseases as a prima facie justification for new regulations (i.e. the FSMA). 
 
5.2 Methodology 
       Foodborne disease incidence has been a key argument for the institution of new regulations 
(FDA 2011c). It is argued that disease incidence is increasing in recent times. An observation, 
the FDA suggested that increasing incidents are an indication of the infectiveness of current 
regulations in ensuring the safety of food in the US (FDA 2011c). Hence, the FSMA needed to 
be enacted as a more effective regulation that empowers FDA to embark on a preventive 
approach to food safety. 
       The CDC defines incidence as the number of cases per surveillance population (usually 
100,000 people). Most notable incidences are caused by Salmonella, Campylobacter, E. coli, 
Listeria, Vibrio, Yersinia, Clostridium perfringens and Staphylococcus aureus.  While incidence 
of many of these pathogenic organisms are declining, Salmonella incidence have been 
increasing, and it represents the single most challenging foodborne disease for the US food 
safety systems (CDC 2010). This chapter focuses on analysing the trend
21
 in Salmonella 
foodborne disease incidence as a justification for the FSMA. It is therefore hypothesised that 
FSMA is legitimate if foodborne disease incidence show a significant rising trend. Hence, the 
prima facie justification for new food safety regulations is assessed by testing for a significant 
direct relationship between Salmonella incidence and a time variable (referred to as ―Time‖).  
 
 
5.3 Econometric model 
       The disease incidence of a microbial organism is modelled to follow a pattern where 
incidence at a given time (t) is dependent on previous incidence (t-i). Previous Salmonella 
incidence (i.e. Salmonellat-i) is expected to positively affect current incidence (Salmonellat). The 
reason being that, microbial organisms by virtue of their exponential growth increase 
considerably upon outbreak thereby making past incidences important in predicting future 
occurrences. Hence, Salmonellat-i is expected to have a positive effect on current incidence. 
       Further, we include the ―time‖ variable (measured as number of months) to investigate 
whether incidence are decreasing, increasing or have remained constant over the study period. 
Though sporadic spikes in incidence are not desirable, it is assumed that food safety institutions 
are more concerned about trend. A rising trend implies that the food safety systems in the US are 
ineffective and therefore need strengthening. Hence, time is expected to have a significant 
                                                          
21
 Trend is the relationship between Salmonella incidence and time. 
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positive effect on Salmonella incidence to justify the enactment of FSMA. Salmonella incidence 
is therefore modelled as:  
 
 
Where: 
 i = 1, 2, 3, ……., 11 ( number of lags) 
β and ε measures constant and error terms respectively. 
 
5.3.1 Testing for structural break 
       Further, the FDA (2011c) argued that the trend in Salmonella foodborne disease is as well 
changing. However, studies showing trend of Salmonella have largely not considered statistical 
changes. Hence, we first of all explore the data for any possible changes in Salmonella incidence 
trend (.i.e. testing for structural break). Testing for unknown alterations in a time series variable 
is important since data involving breaks could mislead − leading to conclusions that the data is 
non-stationary (Madalla and Kim 1998). In this study, examining the data for altered trend is 
helpful in shedding light on the behavior of disease incidence over time. For example, although 
the overall incidence could be rising as argued, there is a possibility that incidence could be 
falling in recent times. Such an observation implies that foodborne disease incidence are 
beginning to fall and do not merit new regulations. 
       Testing for breakpoints has been pioneered by the Chow Test. However, the Chow Test 
requires the exact break date to be known and the estimated Chow statistic is then compared with 
critical values of the F-distribution. Where the statistic is significant, then we conclude that a 
break occurred at the given point. Hence, a major limitation of the Chow Test is its 
inapplicability where the researcher does not have a definite date in mind (Madalla and Kim 
1998).  In view of this, Quandt (1958, 1960) proposed the Supremum (Max Chow) Test as a 
technique for estimating statistical break dates where the exact break date is unknown. 
According to Allaro et al (2010, p. 394): 
These tests are calculated by using individual Chow Statistics for each date of the data except from 
some trimmed portion from both ends of it. The Supremum test is calculated for and finds the date that 
maximizes Chow Statistics which also is the most possible break point.  
       Madala and Kim (2000) indicated that breakpoints must be tested for within the range of the 
15
th
 percentile and 85
th
 percentile of the data range in order to avoid breaks to the tails. Although 
the full disease incidence ranges from January 1995 to December 2010, the test is carried over 
the period of July 1997 to September 2008, inclusive. The Chow Test is therefore the basic unit 
underlying Quandt‘s analysis. The Chow formula has an F-distribution given as:       
 
        (5.2)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Where: 
RSST= sum of squared risiduals for the pooled model 
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RSS1 = sum of squared reisduals for sub-sample model 1 
RSS2 = sum of squared residual for sub-sample model 2 
k = number of estimated parameters including the constant term 
n1 = sample 1‘s sample size 
n2 = sample 2‘s sample size 
n =  total sample size(i.e. n1 + n2) 
(Adapted from Madalla and Kim 2000) 
       The estimated Chow statistics are plotted over time. However, the Max Chow statistic is the 
highest absolute significant statistic tested under critical values provided by Andrews (1993). 
The Max-Chow is distributed as: 
 
 
Where: 
m = breakpoint 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Hansen (2009))  
        
The data is said to have multiple breakpoints when two or more significant statistics have equal 
absolute values.  Evidence of a structural break will amount to estimating equation (5.1) in two 
sub-models as in (5.2) and (5.3):  
 
 
Where there is no break, the equation 5.1 will be estimated.  
 
 
5.4 Results and discussion 
       The results of the analysis of Salmonella for foodborne disease incidence as a justification 
for FSMA are presented in subsections below. The analysis covers descriptive statistics, trend in 
incidence, structural break test and the estimated disease incidence model. 
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5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
       The data on foodborne disease incidence was sourced from the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) of the US and ranges from January 1995 to December 2010. It is limited 
to 2010 because the new regulation was signed in January 2011. Hence, it is expected that the 
reasons for the institution of the new regulations would be observable prior to 2011
22
. 
       The average and median infection per month of Salmonella in the US are about 319.4 and 
233 respectively over the study period.  While the minimum and maximum incidence per month 
is about 7 and 1873 respectively, the data is positively skewed. This implies that majority of the 
data points are closer to the lower tail (Table 5.4.1). 
 
Table 5.4.1 Descriptive statistics of Salmonella incidence 
Statistic SAMONELLA 
 Mean  319.4167 
 Median  233.0000 
 Maximum  1873.000 
 Minimum  7.000000 
 Std. Dev.  291.4810 
 Skewness  2.153130 
 Kurtosis  9.331644 
 Jarque-Bera  469.0687 
 Probability  0.000000 
 Sum  61328.00 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  16227587 
 Observations  192 
 
 
5.4.2 Salmonella disease incidence 
       The monthly foodborne disease incidence for Salmonella in the US from January 1995 to 
December 2010 is shown in Fig 5.4.2.1. The vertical and horizontal axes are disease incidence 
(in natural logarithms) and years respectively. Monthly data shows frequent fluctuations in 
Salmonella incidence across years. 
                                                          
22
 Besides, 2011 data is still provisional and could not be used in the analysis. 
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                      Fig 5.4.2.1 Trend in Salmonella incidence in US: 1995 – 2010 
 
5.4.3 Results of structural break test  
       The plot of Chow-statistic from the period May 1997 to September 2008 is presented in Fig 
5.4.3.1 below. The vertical axis is composed of Chow-statistics and critical values while the 
horizontal axis is the years.  Chow values are significant at the point where absolute value is 
greater than or equal to the critical value. In the diagram, the Maximum Chow value is 4.35 but 
this is below Andrew (1993)‘s critical values at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent. Hence, it is 
concluded that there are no structural break(s) in Salmonella incidence over the study period. 
The Salmonella incidence model is therefore estimated in a single equation as in (5.1). 
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            Fig 5.4.3.1 Max Chow test for break in Salmonella incidence 
 
5.4.4 Estimated Salmonella incidence model 
       The results of Salmonella foodborne disease incidence is shown in Table 5.4.4. The 
coefficient of determination (R-square) is 0.044622 indicating that about 4.5 percent of the 
variation in incidence is explained by the model. Further, the F- statistic (0.013692) is significant 
at 5 percent, implying that independent variables jointly explain the variations in Salmonella 
incidence. The LM test for serial correlation (Table A5.4.4.1) and the White Heteroskedasticity 
test (Table A5.4.4.2) are both not significant. Hence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no 
spherical disturbances in the model. 
       Previous incidence (SALM(-1)) has a positive effect on current incidence, and it is 
significant at 1 percent. This, in part, confirms the hypothesis that past incidence increases future 
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outbreaks. The results show that a 1 percent increase in previous incidence will increase current 
incidence about 0.13 percent.  
       Further, the Time (0.770412) has a positive effect on disease incidence and is significant at 5 
percent. The positive relationship between incidence and Time shows that disease incidence 
increases over time. This suggests that US food regulations are becoming obsolete in preventing 
Salmonella outbreaks and justifies the US decision to strengthen food safety regulations.  
 
Table 5.4.4 Estimated Salmonella disease incidence model 
Dependent Variable: SAMONELLA  
Included observations: 191 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 203.4420 45.29555 4.491434     0.0000 
SAMONELLA(-1) 0.130412 0.072310 1.803516       0.0729* 
TIME 0.770412 0.382212 2.015667        0.0453** 
     
     
R-squared 0.044622     Mean dependent var 319.7801 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034459     S.D. dependent var 292.2035 
S.E. of regression 287.1248     Akaike info criterion 14.17329 
Sum squared resid 15498846     Schwarz criterion 14.22438 
Log likelihood -1350.550     F-statistic 4.390413 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.028822     Prob(F-statistic) 0.013692 
     
     
** and * are significance at 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
 
5.5 Summary 
       The Salmonella incidence in the US has been rising over time. The results show that 
Salmonella foodborne disease incidence has a significant positive relationship with time. This 
suggest that present food safety regulations may becoming less effective and might justify the 
US decision to strengthen its food safety laws. However, the Max Chow Test failed to establish 
evidence of statistical change in Salmonella foodborne disease incidence trend over the study 
period. 
       Having looked at the trend in Salmonella foodborne disease incidence as the justification for 
the FSMA, the next chapter proceeds to examine the implications of the FSMA for the relative 
competitiveness of US and foreign firms. 
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Chapter 6: FSMA and Competitiveness of Firms 
 
6.1 Introduction 
       This chapter presents a graphical analysis of the relative competitiveness of domestic and 
foreign firms under the FSMA. A partial equilibrium model is used to analyze the economic 
competitiveness of firms under the new regulation under two scenarios: (1) all firms face equal 
compliance cost; and (2) compliance cost is higher for foreign firms. Compliance cost is 
assumed to be a variable cost such that it affects both the average and marginal costs of a firm. It 
is also assumed that there are no transportation or transaction costs. Finally, we assume that 
firms operate in a perfectly competitive market, are equal in size and cost, and produce the same 
kind of product referred to here as a particular fruit or vegetable. 
 
6.2 Equal compliance cost 
       The Fig 6.1 below illustrates the scenario where compliance cost is equal for US and foreign 
firms supplying a fruit (or vegetable) into the market (i.e. US domestic market). It is also 
assumed under this scenario that both foreign and domestic firms can supply the market without 
any existing trade barriers inhibiting the foreign firm‘s access to the market. The vertical and 
horizontal axes in each graph represent price and quantity respectively. Further, the average cost 
facing the US and foreign firm are c
u
 and c
f
 with associated marginal costs mc
u
 and mc
f
 
respectively. Prior to the implementation of the FSMA, the US and foreign firm produce q
u
 and 
q
f
 of fruit (or vegetable) respectively. Representing the market demand as D and market supply 
by S
23
, the equilibrium quantity and price of the fruit (or vegetable) in the market will be P and Q 
respectively, where market supply equals demand. 
       If compliance cost increase by equal margins to c
u’
 and c
f‘ for both the US and foreign firm, 
output will decrease to qu’ and qf’ respectively. Consequently, industry supply will decline from 
S to S
1
. The decline in supply for fixed demand leads to an increase in market price from P to P
1
 
whiles quantity demanded decline from Q to Q
1
. Each firm will therefore be making normal 
profit after FSMA. Hence, competitiveness of one firm relative to another does not change when 
compliance cost increase by same margin.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Where the supply curve is the horizontal sum of the individual firm marginal cost curves over the relevant range – 
including those of our illustrative firms. Hence, the scales on the quantity axes are not the same in the market graph 
and for those of the firms. 
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Fig 6.1 Firm competitiveness under equal compliance cost 
 
6.3 Higher compliance cost for foreign firms 
       The second scenario considers the case where foreign firms face a higher compliance cost 
compared to their US counterparts. The reason for the higher cost is partly because while US 
firms would be inspected once a year under the FSMA, foreign firms must be inspected not less 
than twice and the costs of inspection are born by the firms.  In addition, the law exempts small 
scale producers in the US from traceability and HACCP measures. As such, the compliance cost 
for foreign firm (=c
f’
- c
f
) is higher than that of the domestic firm (= c
u’
-c
u
) as shown in Fig 6.2. If 
both firms were to have equal increase in cost, then Q
1
 output will be supplied as in Figure 6.1 at 
price P
1
. However, since the US firm has a lesser compliance cost it will be benefiting from the 
supernormal profits created (equal to the shaded area) at P
1
. The supernormal profit will attract 
more US firms into the industry thereby increasing industry supply from S
1
 to S
2
 while price falls 
to P
2
 (i.e. equilibrium output supplied increase to Q
2
). The decline in price implies that foreign 
firms will be selling below cost and therefore exit the market in the long-run. Hence, foreign 
firms are less competitive when domestic firms face a lower compliance cost.  
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Fig 6.2 Firm competiveness under un-equal compliance cost 
 
6.4 Summary 
       FSMA will not affect the relative competitiveness of firms when compliance cost increase 
by equal margin for both the US and foreign firm. However, when foreign firms face a higher 
compliance cost, supernormal profits will be created for US firms and this will continue to attract 
new firms in the US. The sustained entry will therefore increase industry supply given a fixed 
demand and cause equilibrium market price to fall. The fall in price will cause foreign firms to 
incur losses and eventually exit production in the long run. Hence, foreign firms are less 
competitive when compliance cost is lower for domestic firms. The implication is that the market 
share of foreign firms declines while those of domestic firms increase. This is the reason for 
National Treatment principle being a part of trade agreements. The net effect is the same as 
imposing formal border measures such as tariffs. 
       Having examined the implications of FSMA on the relative competitiveness of foreign and 
US firms, the next chapter examines the conformity of the regulations to the WTO, SPS and 
NAFTA. 
50 
 
Chapter 7: Conformity of FSMA to WTO, NAFTA and SPS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
       This chapter discusses the conformity of the FSMA provisions to WTO general principles, 
the WTO‘s SPS agreement and NAFTA commitments. 
 
7.2 Conformity to WTO 
       The WTO employs two major principles to ensure that the actions of countries are not 
applied indiscriminately to inhibit trade. These are the Most-Favoured-Nation principle and the 
National Treatment principle. 
       The Most-favoured-nation (MFN) implies that when a country offers special trade measures 
such as lowered tariffs or other preference in connection with export or importation to a trading 
partner (its most favoured-nation), other WTO members automatically become entitled to such 
offers (GATT 1947, Article I). Member countries cannot offer discriminatory trade measures 
such that some countries face higher tariffs than others. The FSMA suggests that countries that 
are perceived to have lax food safety laws will be targeted and those that demonstrate that their 
food safety standards provide the same level of protection may be recognised as equivalent to 
FSMA. This is legitimate under Article 4 of the SPS agreement which allows countries to 
discriminate or require stricter measures against products from countries whose food safety 
regulations are considered not to be equivalent to their domestic regulations. In these cases the 
non-discrimination requirement is waived. In view of this, we conclude that FSMA is in 
compliance with Most-Favoured-Nation Principle. 
       The National treatment principle bans discrimination against an imported product once it 
gets into the domestic market. Although the US attempted to introduce the certain Country of 
Origin Labelling (COOL) provisions that sought to differentiate between imported and domestic 
beef and pork products, this was struck out by WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The DSP ruled in 
November 2011, that COOL is a TBT measure and conveys a less favourable treatment to 
foreign beef and pork and hence is inconsistent with the US obligation under the WTO (WTO 
2012). For now, the FSMA does not specify any preferential treatments for domestic goods when 
it takes effect. Imported fruit and vegetables once they clear border inspections and enter the US 
market are expected to be treated the same way as domestic products. We therefore conclude that 
FSMA does not have any intent that seems to violate the National Treatment principle and, 
hence, conforms to general WTO principle. 
 
7.3 Conformity to SPS Agreement 
       Member countries can take food safety measures in accordance with the SPS agreement to 
protect lives and the environment provided those measures are based on sound science (SPS 
Agreement, Article 1). Further, the SPS agreement requires that in order for food safety 
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measures to not arbitrarily inhibit trade, the food safety measures that a country employs must be 
proportionate to the level of risk. With respect to the FSMA, the level of risk that is posed by 
foodborne diseases and illness is not precisely defined. As such, it cannot be ascertained whether 
the standards set out by the FSMA are proportionate to the level of risk. If this proves 
contentious, resolution will have to await the outcome of a challenge at a WTO disputes panel. 
       The SPS also require member countries to execute food safety measures in a non-
discriminatory manner. However, the FSMA exemption  for US small scale farmers from some 
of its  measures (i.e. traceability and HACCP) despite there being no scientific justification 
absolving them may constitute an arbitrary and discriminatory application of food safety 
measures. The US would need to demonstrate to trading partners that US small scale farmers do 
not pose a danger to food safety while similar sized foreign farmers do pose a risk. Without a 
scientific justification, the exemption for small US farmers would qualify as an arbitrary 
application of SPS measures to restrict trade.  
       There are precedents for such actions being considered discriminatory. For example, 
Australia banned the importation of Apples from New Zealand because fire blight was found in 
New Zealand. Fire blight is a fungal disease which damages the leaves of apple trees and young 
shoots thereby greatly inhibiting the ability of apple trees to photosynthesis and fruit. New 
Zealand established that the fire blight was only associated with leaves and could not be 
transmitted by mature apples through trade but Australia maintained that the ban was 
precautionary due to insufficient scientific knowledge. New Zealand subsequently filed a case 
against Australia at the WTO in 2007. In 2010 the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled that 
there was sufficient scientific information to do a risk assessment and the risk assessment 
showed that imports of mature fruit could not lead to spread of fire blight. The Panel therefore 
ruled that Australia‘s ban was inconsistent with its obligation under the application of SPS 
measures (WTO 2011b). 
       The New Zealand-Australia conflict provides some insights about the likely challenges that 
the FSMA might be facing from WTO trading partners. The US might be challenged to prove 
that the risk of foodborne disease in the US is comparable to the standards put against foreign 
firms. In particular, the exemption of domestic small scale farmers in US, and the relatively more 
frequent inspection of foreign firms compared to domestic ones, both of which appear to lack 
scientific justification appear open to challenge. Hence, the FSMA could be viewed as 
inconsistent to US obligation under SPS agreement and imposes a higher compliance cost on 
foreign firms. This is because the FDA determines how frequently foreign firms must be 
inspected and the fees they pay for inspection. When the cost is considerable, foreign firms could 
be rendered less competitive and the FSMA could constitute discriminatory application under the 
SPS (WTO 2011b). 
 
7.4 Conformity with NAFTA 
       The NAFTA incorporates the WTO principles of National Treatment and Most Favoured 
Nation in its agreement. NAFTA members are to extend Most Favoured Nation and National 
Treatment principles to trade within the NAFTA region and must not discriminate between 
trading partners. For now, the FSMA document has not specified any preferential treatment for 
either Canada or Mexico and, hence, can neither be accused of violating National Treatment nor 
the Most Favoured Nation principles under NAFTA. 
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       However, NAFTA has Rules of Origin by which member countries are to maintain lower 
tariffs on products wholly produced in the NAFTA region but extends a higher tariff to non-
NAFTA members (Chapter Four of NAFTA Legal text). Fruits and vegetables produced wholly 
in Canada, Mexico and US are presently qualified as products under NAFTA Rules of Origin. 
NAFTA‘s rule of origin is not considered a violation of National Treatment since WTO 
recognises regional trading blocs such as NAFTA and EU provided their rules are consistent 
with WTO. The reduction in tariffs for NAFTA members is recognised as a measure to further 
enhance trade between NAFTA members. For the most part, the NAFTA applies WTO rules to 
SPS issues. 
 
7.5 Summary 
       While it may be pre-mature to judge the conformity of the regulations, basing conformity of 
the FSMA with NAFTA, WTO and SPS raises some concerns. While generally, the regulations 
follow National Treatment and Most-Favoured Nation principles under the NAFTA and WTO, 
we found the exemption for small scale producers in US without extending the same level of 
exemption to foreign firms to be an arbitrary application of food safety measures. As the FDA 
further develops the new regulatory framework under the FSMA, the results should be closely 
monitored by trading partners. 
       The next Chapter summarises the conclusions covering political influence in fruit and 
vegetable import refusals, prima facie assessment of the justification of FSMA, relative 
competitiveness of foreign and domestic firms under FSMA and the conformity of FSMA to 
international trade agreements. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction 
       The chapter presents the general conclusions, recommendations and suggested areas for 
future research. 
 
8.2 Conclusions 
       The notion that food safety regulations can be politically motivated has received 
considerable attention among academics and policy makers. In particular, it is perceived that one 
way of politically influencing trade flows is by manipulating import refusals under the guise of 
food safety standards. This study used agricultural sector unemployment and antidumping 
against fruit and vegetables as proxies for political interference in fruit and vegetable import 
refusals from Mexico, Canada and China. The results show that rising agricultural sector 
unemployment in the US increases import refusals from Mexico and Canada in the long-run. 
Agricultural sector unemployment in the US has no significant effect on import refusals from 
China. It is arguable that farm labour could better approximate unemployment situation in the 
fruit and vegetable industry. Farm labourers, however, neither have a strong political force nor 
the incentive to lobby government for imports retrain. Lobbying better reflect the direct interest 
of producers to protect their firms. Accordingly, a general rise in unemployment across an 
industry reflects the times that business owners are willing to take decision to protect their 
industry as a pressure/lobbying group, thereby making unemployment a better proxy for political 
influence than farm labour,  
      The thesis finds that antidumping has a significant positive effect on import refusals from 
Mexico in the short-run. Further, antidumping has a positive relationship with import refusals 
from Canada and China, it is, however, not significant.  
       In controlling for genuine concerns for safety, the study included number of food safety 
alerts and recalls issued in the US. The results suggest that food safety alerts has a significant 
positive effect on import refusals for Mexico, Canada and China. Hence, increasing number of 
alerts and recalls is associated with increasing fruit and vegetable import refusals. Controlling for 
volume of imports yields similar results. The study finds that as the volume of fruit and 
vegetables imported from a specific country into the US rises, the associated number of 
rejections at the border increase as well for Canada, Mexico and China. 
       In addressing the justification for the FSMA, the thesis investigates the trend in Salmonella 
food borne diseases incidence in the US. The results suggest that Salmonella foodborne disease 
incidence have been rising significantly over the years.  This tends to justify the US decision to 
strengthen food safety laws.  
      The thesis also finds that differences in compliance cost (where foreign firms are faced with 
considerable compliance cost relative to domestic ones) will tend to undermine the 
competitiveness of foreign producers of fruits and vegetables who supply the US market. 
Further, the thesis investigates the conformity of the FSMA to US commitment under NAFTA, 
WTO and SPS measures. It is concluded that although the regulations do not generally violate 
National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation principles under NATFA and WTO, the 
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exemption of small scale US farmers and differences in domestic and foreign inspections likely 
constitute arbitrary applications of SPS measures which violates Article V of the SPS agreement.  
 
8.3 Recommendation 
       Based on the findings of this study, it is recommended that trading partners should closely 
monitor the regulatory environment created by the FSMA and consider mounting challenges 
against the FSMA because the exemption of small scale farmers from US without scientific 
justification constitute an arbitrary application of SPS measures. 
       The use of antidumping to inhibit trade should be carefully reviewed. Countries are advised 
to challenge US fruit and vegetable import refusal behaviour as one that does not follow science, 
but rather is meant to provide economic protection in times of high unemployment and economic 
malaise. 
       Further, while the thesis concludes that foodborne disease incidence is rising and may be 
posing increasing risk to food safety in the US, it is recommended that the US prove that the 
level of risk posed by foodborne diseases is proportionate to the level of stringency that the 
implementation of the FSMA will provide.  
 
8.4 Suggestions for future research 
       The study faced a major challenge in accessing monthly lobbying expenditures for the fruit 
and vegetable industry in US. It could be a major indicator of, and proxy for, political 
motivation. Future research would be improved if lobbying expenditures are used. 
       This study analysed political influence by modelling each country in single equations. Future 
research should consider the analysis in a panel data regression form such that the interactions of 
other countries can be assessed. Modelling the analysis in fixed and random effect models would 
increase the sample size and improve the efficiency of the estimates. 
       The econometric test for cointegration could also be further disaggregated   into test for 
seasonal and deterministic cointegration in future research.  
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                           Fig A4.3.2.1 Import refusals from Mexico  
 
 REFMEX REFCAN REFCHI IMPMEX IMPCAN IMPCHI UNEMPL ALERT ANTID 
 Mean  46.16260  7.365854  22.85366  3.37E+08  77465854  7708171.  10.28195  4.878049  0.373984 
 Median  41.00000  5.000000  19.00000  3.00E+08  75000000  7608000.  9.800000  2.000000  0.000000 
 Maximum  187.0000  82.00000  100.0000  8.05E+08  1.86E+08  15187000  21.30000  45.00000  2.000000 
 Minimum  8.000000  0.000000  3.000000  63000000  12300000  1421000.  2.400000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  27.51613  9.931956  16.09586  1.81E+08  37583066  3584273.  4.069882  7.010046  0.534059 
 Skewness  2.146707  4.795684  1.984688  0.569482  0.366270  0.051867  0.552354  3.124211  1.000982 
 Kurtosis  10.45330  32.11697  8.793544  2.479900  2.268703  1.952258  2.832864  14.68966  2.913379 
 Jarque-Bera  379.1738  4816.435  252.7706  8.034684  5.490968  5.681184  6.397618  900.4156  20.57875 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.018001  0.064217  0.058391  0.040811  0.000000  0.000034 
 Sum  5678.000  906.0000  2811.000  4.15E+10  9.53E+09  9.48E+08  1264.680  600.0000  46.00000 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  92370.75  12034.54  31607.37  3.98E+18  1.72E+17  1.57E+15  2020.800  5995.171  34.79675 
 Observations  123  123  123  123  123  123  123  123  123 
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           Fig A4.3.2.2 Import refusals from Canada 
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           Fig A4.3.2.3 Import refusals from China 
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                  Fig A4.3.2.4 Value of fruit & vegetable imports from Mexico 
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              Fig A4.3.2.5 Value of fruit and vegetable imports from Canada 
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         Fig A4.3.2.6 Value of fruit & vegetable imports from China 
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               Fig A4.3.2.7 Number of food safety alerts and recalls 
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           Fig A4.3.2.8 US Agricultural sector unemployment 
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        Fig A4.3.2.9 No. of antidumping cases against fruit and vegetables 
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Table A4.3.4.1.1 Cointegration test of import refusals equation for Mexico 
Included variables: RMEX, IMPMEX, UNEMP, ALERT, ANTID 
 Intercept Intercept and trend No intercept nor trend 
Rank Eigenvalue Trace stat. Eigenvalue Trace stat. Eigenvalue Trace stat. 
0 50.13622** 122.3053*** 86.32715*** 217.9586*** 86.327*** 217.96*** 
1 36.51280 112.1691 43.92263 111.6314 43.922 111.631 
2 26.69192 65.65628 30.34189 85.70877 30.341 85.708 
3 23.19412 46.96436 23.25887 55.36688 23.258 55.367 
4 13.16696 25.77024 16.64465 32.10801 16.646 32.108 
***, **and * are significance at 1 %, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
 
Table A4.3.4.1.2 Cointegration test of import refusals equation for Canada 
Included variables: RCAN, IMPCAN, UNEMP, ALERT, ANTID 
 Intercept Intercept and trend No intercept nor trend 
Rank Eigenvalue Trace stat Eigenvalue Trace stat Eigenvalue Trace stat 
0 68.44498** 173.9996*** 70.44033*** 205.2725* 70.740*** 205.273*** 
1 39.55236 94.5546 43.90043 115.8321 43.900 115.832 
2 21.12779 59.00228 35.94190 83.93171 35.942 83.931 
3 17.18745 37.87449 19.51422 47.98981 19.514 47.981 
4 12.47897 20.68704 17.18744 28.47559 17.187 28.476 
***, **and * are significance at 1 %, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table A4.3.4.1.3 Cointegration test of import refusals equation for China 
Included variables: RCHI, IMPCHI, UNEMP, ALERT, ANTID 
 Intercept Intercept and trend No intercept nor trend 
Rank Eigenvalue Trace stat Eigenvalue Trace stat Eigenvalue Trace stat 
0 69.17300** 176.5692** 89.77110*** 212.7405*** 30.856** 69.666** 
1 41.01521 94.3962 42.11966 101.9694 23.984 39.813 
2 24.64980 66.38102 29.67843 80.84976 10.215 18.885 
3 20.85561 41.73122 22.31031 51.17133 6.900 8.669 
4 10.95715 20.87561 14.53967 28.86102 1.769 1.769 
***, **and * are significance at 1 %, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
 
Table A4.5.1.1 Lag order of import refusals equation for Mexico 
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
0 -140.9741 NA   3.31e-08  2.642395  2.812301  2.711332 
1  110.9532  467.8650   8.86e-10*  -0.981307*   0.377943*  -0.429816* 
2  153.5884  73.85035  1.00e-09 -0.867651  1.680942  0.166395 
3  192.3166  62.24166  1.23e-09 -0.684224  3.053711  0.832375 
4  223.2058  45.78223  1.79e-09 -0.360818  4.566462  1.638336 
5  260.1173  50.09421  2.41e-09 -0.144952  5.971670  2.336756 
6  303.2797  53.18225  3.03e-09 -0.040709  7.265256  2.923553 
7  380.2593  85.22736  2.21e-09 -0.540344  7.954965  2.906473 
8  430.5235  49.36665  2.80e-09 -0.562920  9.121733  3.366452 
9  488.0771  49.33170  3.45e-09 -0.715663  10.15833  3.696262 
10  548.4982  44.23683  4.64e-09 -0.919610  11.14373  3.974870 
11  693.2582   87.89001*  1.69e-09 -0.819611  10.62307  2.747424 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
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Table A4.5.1.2 Estimated VEC model of import refusals equation for Mexico 
 Sample (adjusted): 3 123    
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
            
REFMEX(-1)  1.000000     
IMPMEX(-1) -10.38601     
  (1.19799)     
 [-8.66955]     
UNEMP(-1) - 3.352590     
  (1.146701)     
 [ -2.92361]     
ALERT(-1) -2.39345     
  (0.44291)     
 [-5.40351]     
ANTID(-1) -0.634833     
  (0.58368)     
 [-1.08764]     
@TREND  0.033306     
C  82.21902     
Error Correction: D(REFMEX) D(IMPMEX) D(UNEMP) D(ALERT) D(ANTID) 
      
      
CointEq1  -0.024460  -0.039780  0.023097  0.001647  0.006795 
  (0.01172)  (0.00553)  (0.00524)  (0.02264)  (0.01168) 
 [2.08711] [ 7.19057] [ 4.40965] [ 0.07277] [ 0.58189] 
D(REFMEX(-1)) -0.466034 -0.052782  0.053862 -0.057201 -0.004002 
  (0.08522)  (0.04023)  (0.03808)  (0.16459)  (0.08490) 
 [-5.46832] [-1.31213] [ 1.41428] [-0.34753] [-0.04714] 
D(IMPMEX(-1))  0.455763  0.576323  0.247968  0.050022  0.143609 
  (0.17163)  (0.08101)  (0.07670)  (0.33147)  (0.17099) 
 [ 2.65546] [ 7.11414] [ 3.23303] [ 0.15091] [ 0.83988] 
D(UNEMP(-1)) 0.075515 -0.125015 -0.154833 -0.689634  0.096751 
  (0.20569)  (0.09709)  (0.09192)  (0.39726)  (0.20492) 
 [0.36712] [-1.28764] [-1.68443] [-1.73600] [ 0.47213] 
D(ALERT(-1))  0.058808  0.039646  0.024184 -0.458379  0.053393 
  (0.02189)  (0.02025)  (0.01917)  (0.08284)  (0.04273) 
 [2.68652] [ 1.95826] [ 1.26172] [-5.53340] [ 1.24949] 
D(ANTID(-1))  1.2074  0.016467 -0.038203  0.150128 -0.005766 
  (0.21121)  (0.04175)  (0.03953)  (0.17084)  (0.08813) 
 [5.7167] [ 0.39439] [-0.96644] [ 0.87877] [-0.06543] 
C  0.001859  0.005998 -0.008486  0.000912 -0.018182 
  (0.04585)  (0.02164)  (0.02049)  (0.08855)  (0.04568) 
 [ 0.04055] [ 0.27715] [-0.41415] [ 0.01030] [-0.39803] 
@TREND(1)  2.70E-05 -7.36E-05  0.000145 -0.000110  0.000147 
  (0.00064)  (0.00030)  (0.00029)  (0.00124)  (0.00064) 
 [ 0.04184] [-0.24220] [ 0.50462] [-0.08815] [ 0.22835] 
      
R-squared  0.237168  0.427272  0.203635  0.235476  0.025017 
F-statistic  5.018885  12.04306  4.127816  4.972049  0.414202 
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Table A4.5.1.3 Normality test of import refusals equation for Mexico 
 
    
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
    
    
1  1.268128 2  0.5304 
2  2.905877 2  0.2339 
3  1.319214 2  0.5171 
4  571.9215 2  0.0000 
5  112.3798 2  0.0000 
    
    
Joint  689.7945 10  0.0000 
    
    
 
 
Table A4.5.1.4 Serial correlation LM test of import refusals equation for Mexico 
 
 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Date: 05/28/12   Time: 12:29 
Sample: 2001M10 2011M12 
Included observations: 121 
   
   
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   
1  28.48011  0.2512 
2  24.60190  0.4801 
3  28.35790  0.2916 
4  31.78819  0.1642 
5  31.12077  0.1698 
6  31.12101  0.1790 
7  18.48075  0.7874 
8  19.43650  0.7757 
9  33.63280  0.1160 
10  24.69522  0.4796 
11  29.58694  0.2401 
12  28.58532  0.2410 
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Table A4.5.1.5 Heteroskedasticity test of import refusals equation for Mexico 
 
 
VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: Includes Cross Terms  
Date: 05/28/12   Time: 12:21    
Sample: 2001M10 2011M12    
Included observations: 121    
      
      
      
   Joint test:     
      
      
Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
      
 532.0717 525  0.4060    
      
      
      
   Individual components:    
      
      
Dependent R-squared F(35,85) Prob. Chi-sq(35) Prob. 
      
      
res1*res1  0.309521  0.828500  0.9128  29.97199  0.8623 
res2*res2  0.282448  0.754009  0.8659  28.27626  0.8563 
res3*res3  0.233332  0.739126  0.8405  28.23321  0.7842 
res4*res4  0.330062  1.196500  0.2496  39.93756  0.2600 
res5*res5  0.201281  0.612011  0.9472  24.35497  0.9113 
res2*res1  0.300336  1.042481  0.4263  36.34063  0.4060 
res3*res1  0.305219  1.066880  0.3946  36.93155  0.3797 
res3*res2  0.290813  0.995872  0.4900  35.18834  0.4593 
res4*res1  0.354233  1.332184  0.1437  42.86220  0.1696 
res4*res2  0.252444  0.820109  0.7407  30.54568  0.6830 
res4*res3  0.320400  1.144961  0.3021  38.76845  0.3035 
res5*res1  0.375752  1.461825  0.1204  45.46601  0.1108 
res5*res2  0.245169  0.788798  0.7816  29.66540  0.7232 
res5*res3  0.262974  0.866526  0.6763  31.81990  0.6224 
res5*res4  0.280952  0.948911  0.5571  33.99520  0.5165 
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Table A4.5.2.1 Lag order of import refusals equation for Canada 
Included observations: 112     
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -127.5832 NA   2.61e-08  2.403272  2.573178  2.472208 
1  80.60443  386.6342   1.52e-09*  -0.439365*   0.919885*   0.112126* 
2  121.9900   71.68579*  1.76e-09 -0.303394  2.245199  0.730652 
3  154.5808  52.37796  2.42e-09 -0.010371  3.727565  1.506229 
4  191.9446  55.37852  3.13e-09  0.197418  5.124697  2.196572 
5  229.0410  50.34511  4.19e-09  0.409982  6.526605  2.891691 
6  259.2040  37.16510  6.65e-09  0.746358  8.052323  3.710620 
7  316.5816  63.52525  6.88e-09  0.596757  9.092066  4.043574 
8  371.9987  54.42749  7.95e-09  0.482166  10.16682  4.411537 
9  421.2395  42.20637  1.14e-08  0.477867  11.35186  4.889792 
10  489.1345  49.70884  1.34e-08  0.140456  12.20379  5.034936 
11  592.2785  62.62314  1.02e-08  -0.108260  12.42628  4.550633 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
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Table A4.5.2.2 Estimated VEC model of import refusals equation for Canada 
 
 Included observations: 121 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
      
      
REFCAN(-1)  1.000000     
IMPCAN(-1) -1.633905     
  (0.21239)     
 [-7.69306]     
UNEMP(-1) -1.282111     
  (0.23797)     
 [-5.38775]     
ALERT(-1) -0.267799     
  (0.08610)     
 [-3.11036]     
ANTID(-1)  -0.103433     
  (0.07233)     
 [-1.43005]     
@TREND  0.007018     
C  13.00450     
      
      
Error Correction: D(REFCAN) D(IMPCAN) D(UNEMP) D(ALERT) D(ANTID) 
      
      
CointEq1 -0.769446  0.224568 -0.030934  0.196677 -0.026242 
  (0.13377)  (0.05318)  (0.03669)  (0.15198)  (0.07948) 
 [-5.75217] [ 4.22318] [-0.84306] [ 1.29409] [-0.33017] 
D(REFCAN(-1))  0.014259 -0.124264  0.047668 -0.009714  0.014743 
  (0.10299)  (0.04094)  (0.02825)  (0.11702)  (0.06120) 
 [ 0.13845] [-3.03513] [ 1.68731] [-0.08301] [ 0.24091] 
D(IMPCAN(-1)) 0.629207  0.023624 -0.276000  0.051781  0.044625 
  (0.23799)  (0.09460)  (0.06528)  (0.27039)  (0.14140) 
 [2.64389] [ 0.24971] [-4.22797] [ 0.19150] [ 0.31559] 
D(UNEMP(-1)) 0.122241 -0.281261 -0.097709 -0.473759  0.172134 
  (0.34953)  (0.14012)  (0.09668)  (0.40047)  (0.20943) 
 [0.34973] [-2.00732] [-1.01059] [-1.18299] [ 0.82191] 
D(ALERT(-1)) 0.14579  0.070457  0.022570 -0.431097  0.044742 
  (0.06151)  (0.02922)  (0.02016)  (0.08351)  (0.04367) 
 [2.3705] [ 2.41150] [ 1.11951] [-5.16249] [ 1.02453] 
D(ANTID(-1)) 0.138696 -0.029141 -0.015868  0.147570  0.000610 
  (0.14668)  (0.05831)  (0.04023)  (0.16665)  (0.08715) 
 [0.94557] [-0.49978] [-0.39440] [ 0.88549] [ 0.00700] 
C  0.000330 -0.004797 -0.003187  0.001330 -0.014708 
  (0.07679)  (0.03053)  (0.02106)  (0.08724)  (0.04563) 
 [ 0.00430] [-0.15715] [-0.15132] [ 0.01524] [-0.32237] 
@TREND  7.38E-05  0.000136  0.000102 -0.000123  9.89E-05 
  (0.00108)  (0.00043)  (0.00030)  (0.00123)  (0.00064) 
 [ 0.06838] [ 0.31578] [ 0.34503] [-0.10057] [ 0.15410] 
      
      
 R-squared  0.366273  0.232296  0.152923  0.253015  0.020917 
 F-statistic  9.330035  4.884591  2.914282  5.467818  0.344866 
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Table A4.5.2.3 Normality test of import refusals equation for Canada 
 
    
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
    
    
1  3.001631 2  0.2229 
2  174.3493 2  0.0000 
3  0.862459 2  0.6497 
4  675.5058 2  0.0000 
5  2.602187 2  0.2722 
    
    
Joint  856.3214 10  0.0000 
    
    
    
 
 
Table A4.5.2.4 Serial correlation LM test of import refusals equation for Canada 
 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Date: 05/28/12   Time: 12:38 
Sample: 2001M10 2011M12 
Included observations: 121 
   
   
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   
1  25.41110  0.4395 
2  25.19133  0.4517 
3  25.19093  0.4517 
4  24.66586  0.4216 
5  16.67354  0.8933 
6  17.15578  0.8761 
7  18.92435  0.8875 
8  15.90000  0.9178 
9  22.65598  0.5976 
10  13.33233  0.9722 
11  17.22291  0.8850 
12  15.85177  0.8913 
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Table A4.5.2.5 Heteroskedasticity test of import refusals equation for Canada 
 
VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
Date: 05/28/12   Time: 12:43    
Sample: 2001M10 2011M12    
Included observations: 121    
      
      
      
   Joint test:     
      
      
Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
      
 187.8018 180  0.3298    
      
      
      
   Individual components:    
      
      
Dependent R-squared F(12,108) Prob. Chi-sq(12) Prob. 
      
      
res1*res1  0.085680  0.843385  0.6060  10.36733  0.5838 
res2*res2  0.071201  0.831794  0.5960  10.49537  0.5601 
res3*res3  0.111602  1.130600  0.3434  13.50390  0.3335 
res4*res4  0.105730  1.064070  0.3975  12.79328  0.3842 
res5*res5  0.100001  1.000010  0.4541  12.10011  0.4377 
res2*res1  0.130203  1.136902  0.1012  11.15454  0.4101 
res3*res1  0.108335  1.093479  0.3730  13.10856  0.3612 
res3*res2  0.037744  0.589904  0.9584  13.02101  0.3625 
res4*res1  0.031456  0.292302  0.9895  3.806217  0.9867 
res4*res2  0.047693  0.450737  0.9384  5.770886  0.9272 
res4*res3  0.133340  1.384700  0.1842  16.13419  0.1852 
res5*res1  0.032935  0.306511  0.9871  3.985151  0.9837 
res5*res2  0.088255  0.871177  0.5781  10.67881  0.5566 
res5*res3  0.041582  0.390474  0.9644  5.031416  0.9569 
res5*res4  0.092987  0.922680  0.5272  11.25143  0.5075 
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Table A4.5.3.1 Lag order of import refusals equation for China 
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       
0 -137.5298 NA   3.12e-08  2.580889  2.750796  2.649826 
1  123.2980  484.3945   7.10e-10*  -1.201750*   0.157499*  -0.650260* 
2  149.2686  44.98470  1.08e-09 -0.790510  1.758083  0.243535 
3  175.9191  42.83119  1.65e-09 -0.391412  3.346524  1.125187 
4  221.7366  67.90816  1.84e-09 -0.334583  4.592696  1.664571 
5  257.6175  48.69551  2.52e-09 -0.100313  6.016309  2.381395 
6  296.0742  47.38414  3.44e-09  0.087960  7.393926  3.052223 
7  369.1883  80.94774  2.69e-09 -0.342649  8.152660  3.104168 
8  428.7329  58.48130  2.89e-09 -0.530945  9.153707  3.398426 
9  479.4095  43.43708  4.02e-09 -0.560884  10.31311  3.851042 
10  572.3609  68.05371  3.03e-09 -1.190731  10.71761  3.548749 
11  697.8222   76.17292*  1.56e-09 -1.171111  10.54157  2.665924 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
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Table A4.5.3.2 Estimated VEC model of import refusals equation for China 
 Included observations: 121 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
      
      
REFCHI(-1)  1.000000     
IMPCHI(-1) -37.07205     
  (5.82129)     
 [-6.36836]     
UNEMP(-1) -0.264101     
  (0.41284)     
 [-1.56321]     
ALERT(-1) - 6.308861     
  (2.27896)     
 [ -2.76831]     
ANTID(-1) - 0.056059     
  (1.97333)     
 [- 0.02841]     
@TREND  -0.248285     
C  260.4409     
      
      
Error Correction: D(REFCHI) D(IMPCHI) D(UNEMP) D(ALERT) D(ANTID) 
      
      
CointEq1 -0.005008  0.009738  0.008111 -0.003590 -0.000729 
  (0.00467)  (0.00175)  (0.00180)  (0.00766)  (0.00397) 
 [-1.07261] [ 5.56605] [ 4.50425] [-0.46839] [-0.18386] 
D(REFCHI(-1)) -0.494332 -0.002897 -0.059839  0.150659  0.024252 
  (0.08278)  (0.03102)  (0.03193)  (0.13590)  (0.07033) 
 [-5.97197] [-0.09338] [-1.87428] [ 1.10864] [ 0.34483] 
D(IMPCHI(-1)) 0.075918  0.060950  0.096267 -0.039184  0.200486 
  (0.03280)  (0.08724)  (0.08979)  (0.38220)  (0.19780) 
 [2.3145] [ 0.69865] [ 1.07212] [-0.10252] [ 1.01358] 
D(UNEMP(-1))  0.327921  0.253845  0.141647 -0.772109  0.110186 
  (0.23134)  (0.08669)  (0.08923)  (0.37980)  (0.19656) 
 [ 1.41747] [ 2.92806] [ 1.58745] [-2.03292] [ 0.56057] 
D(ALERT(-1))  0.082215 -0.020883 -0.025859 -0.422593  0.055514 
  (0.02489)  (0.02057)  (0.02117)  (0.09012)  (0.04664) 
 [3.3031] [-1.01521] [-1.22137] [-4.68936] [ 1.19030] 
D(ANTID(-1))  0.134666  0.020515 -0.028907  0.162429  0.004412 
  (0.10240)  (0.03837)  (0.03950)  (0.16812)  (0.08701) 
 [ 1.31507] [ 0.53459] [-0.73189] [ 0.96616] [ 0.05071] 
C  0.025301  0.014589 -0.001432 -0.002922 -0.019969 
  (0.05369)  (0.02012)  (0.02071)  (0.08815)  (0.04562) 
 [ 0.47121] [ 0.72503] [-0.06917] [-0.03315] [-0.43770] 
@TREND 0.000161 -0.000152  4.76E-05 -6.44E-05  0.000159 
  (0.00075)  (0.00028)  (0.00029)  (0.00124)  (0.00064) 
 [0.21344] [-0.53729] [ 0.16390] [-0.05206] [ 0.24840] 
      
      
 R-squared  0.295251  0.246237  0.189046  0.244804  0.030599 
 F-statistic  6.762965  5.273509  3.763155  5.232869  0.509549 
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Table A4.5.3.3 Normality test of import refusals equation for China 
 
    
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
    
    
1  3.977419 2  0.1369 
2  12.49575 2  0.0019 
3  225.5272 2  0.0000 
4  2.324467 2  0.3128 
5  580.0192 2  0.0000 
    
    
Joint  824.3441 10  0.0000 
    
    
 
 
Table A4.5.3.4 Serial correlation LM test of import refusals for China 
 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Date: 05/28/12   Time: 12:55 
Sample: 2001M10 2011M12 
Included observations: 121 
   
   
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   
1  24.06276  0.5157 
2  22.78968  0.6548 
3  20.31132  0.7139 
4  29.15844  0.2573 
5  23.89168  0.5256 
6  31.77453  0.1646 
7  32.12412  0.1853 
8  21.56084  0.6610 
9  28.29883  0.2943 
10  24.53049  0.4889 
11  25.62654  0.4277 
12  26.11269  0.4210 
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Table A4.5.3.5 Heteroskedasticity test of import refusals for China 
 
 
VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
Date: 05/28/12   Time: 13:00   
Sample: 2001M10 2011M12   
Included observations: 121   
     
     
     
   Joint test:    
     
     
Chi-sq df Prob.   
     
     
 177.2414 180  0.5442   
     
     
     
   Individual components:   
     
     
Dependent R-squared F(12,108) Prob. Chi-sq(12) 
     
     
res1*res1  0.075140  0.731201  0.7182  9.091927 
res2*res2  0.070886  0.686650  0.7611  8.577231 
res3*res3  0.033699  0.313868  0.9856  4.077584 
res4*res4  0.060744  0.582056  0.8525  7.350069 
res5*res5  0.116887  1.191216  0.2986  14.14327 
res2*res1  0.031120  0.289076  0.9900  3.765516 
res3*res1  0.118366  1.208313  0.2867  14.32224 
res3*res2  0.033581  0.312727  0.9859  4.063256 
res4*res1  0.093567  0.929034  0.5211  11.32166 
res4*res2  0.147828  1.561246  0.1140  17.88717 
res4*res3  0.067259  0.648985  0.7958  8.138383 
res5*res1  0.068588  0.662746  0.7833  8.299116 
res5*res2  0.069051  0.667557  0.7789  8.355208 
res5*res3  0.092733  0.919901  0.5299  11.22068 
res5*res4  0.097863  0.976312  0.4760  11.84143 
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Table A5.4.4.1 Serial correlation test in Salmonella incidence  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 1.543807     Prob. F(12,176) 0.112477 
Obs*R-squared 18.18991     Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.110045 
     
     
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/27/12   Time: 16:19   
Sample: 1995M02 2010M12   
Included observations: 191   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 3003.651 4331.550 0.693435 0.4890 
SAM(-1) -12.83210 18.56363 -0.691249 0.4903 
YEAR 11.18168 16.39232 0.682129 0.4961 
RESID(-1) 12.77213 18.56291 0.688046 0.4923 
RESID(-2) 1.761853 2.421212 0.727674 0.4678 
RESID(-3) 0.247625 0.324531 0.763023 0.4465 
RESID(-4) -0.076119 0.088788 -0.857305 0.3924 
RESID(-5) -0.157819 0.079870 -1.975936 0.0497 
RESID(-6) -0.050337 0.082368 -0.611122 0.5419 
RESID(-7) -0.120708 0.082291 -1.466836 0.1442 
RESID(-8) -0.101297 0.082917 -1.221666 0.2235 
RESID(-9) -0.086911 0.083294 -1.043421 0.2982 
RESID(-10) 0.052228 0.083461 0.625777 0.5323 
RESID(-11) -0.006016 0.083971 -0.071646 0.9430 
RESID(-12) 0.080156 0.083034 0.965343 0.3357 
     
     
R-squared 0.095235     Mean dependent var 1.95E-14 
Adjusted R-squared 0.023265     S.D. dependent var 285.6096 
S.E. of regression 282.2677     Akaike info criterion 14.19887 
Sum squared resid 14022811     Schwarz criterion 14.45428 
Log likelihood -1340.992     F-statistic 1.323263 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.994866     Prob(F-statistic) 0.197595 
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Table A5.4.4.2 White Heteroskedasticity test in Salmonella incidence 
 
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 1.640223     Prob. F(4,186) 0.165909 
Obs*R-squared 6.507709     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.164305 
     
     
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/28/12   Time: 13:24   
Sample: 1995M02 2010M12   
Included observations: 191   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 155060.7 59714.90 2.596683 0.0102 
SAMONELLA(-1) -152.1335 153.4313 -0.991541 0.3227 
SAMONELLA(-1)^2 0.078695 0.111189 0.707766 0.4800 
@Time -2083.751 1320.102 -1.578478 0.1162 
(@(Time)^2 13.05230 6.678229 1.954455 0.0521 
     
     
R-squared 0.034072     Mean dependent var 81145.79 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013299     S.D. dependent var 248743.9 
S.E. of regression 247084.3     Akaike info criterion 27.69868 
Sum squared resid 1.14E+13     Schwarz criterion 27.78381 
Log likelihood -2640.224     F-statistic 1.640223 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.994229     Prob(F-statistic) 0.165909 
     
     
 
 
 
